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Some time in the mid-1990s, I began to encounter variations on the
following argument, which was popular with certain of my colleagues and
with students who had fallen under their influence.
(i) Semantics is about truth-conditions.
(ii) Only utterances have truth-conditions.
(iii) Hence, a semantic theory must assign truth-conditions to utterances.
(iv) Only a theory that incorporated a complete theory of human rationality
could assign truth-conditions to utterances.
(v) So there is no such thing as a semantic theory (in anything like the
usual sense).
The argument need not be formulated in terms of truth-conditions. The first
premise could equally be stated as: Semantics is about the expression of
propositions. The rest of the argument then adapts smoothly. So (i) is meant
to be obvious and uncontroversial.
With regard to the second premise, it is important to appreciate the force
of the word “only”: (ii) asserts that (perhaps with a very few exceptions, such
as statements of pure mathematics) sentences never have truth-conditions;
only utterances do. So what underwrites (ii) is not just the existence of
context-dependence but, rather, its ubiquity. As has become clear over the
last few decades, it is not just the obvious expressions—like “I”, “here”,
“this”, and the like—whose meaning seems to vary with the circumstances
of utterance. All of the following sentences seem as if they could express
different propositions on different occasions, due to context-dependence
connected with the italicized expressions:
• No-one passed the test.
• John is riding his bike.
• There are no tall gymnasts.
∗A shortened version of this paper is to appear in A. Burgess and B. Sherman, eds., New
Essays on Metasemantics (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Excluded from the published
version are sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5; there are minor changes elsewhere.
1
2Indeed, context-dependence seems to be the norm.
Premises (i) and (ii) are supposed jointly to imply (iii). If sentences
do not (ordinarily) have truth-conditions, then semantics cannot be in the
business of assigning truth-conditions to sentences. Truth-conditions have
instead to be assigned to utterances (or, if you prefer, to sentences relative
to contexts). Now, to assign a truth-condition to an utterance, one has to
know how the context in which that utterance is made ‘resolves’ the context-
dependence: how the context determines a value for a demonstrative, or a
domain for a quantifier, or what have you. As Kaplan would have us put it:
We must specify the character of each context-dependent expression, where
character is a function from contexts to contents. Semantics, then, will issue
in statements like:
• “That is a frog” is true with respect to a context C if, and only if, φ(C)
is a frog.
• “Every student passed” is true with respect to a context C if, and only
if, every student in the domain ψ(C) passed.
One central task of semantics, on this view, is thus to specify (in an infor-
mative way) the functions φ, ψ, and so forth that are associated with the
various context-dependent expressions.
Premise (iv) asserts that this cannot be done. My early protagonists were
particularly impressed by a set of examples concerning color words, such
as “This ink is blue”. Someone who uttered this sentence would typically
mean that the ink would be blue when it had dried on the page, rather
than that it was blue when in the bottle, but of course one might also mean
that. Or consider “This kettle is black”. That might mean that the kettle
presently appears black, perhaps because it has been painted; but it might
also mean that it would be black (rather than gray) once cleaned of accu-
mulated grime. What proposition a particular utterance of such a sentence
expresses seems to depend heavily upon the interests, beliefs, and so forth
of the conversational participants. One might conjecture, therefore, that
absolutely anything could prove relevant to determining which proposition
was expressed on a given occasion. In fact, this point had long before been
argued in detail by Katz and Fodor (1963). Their topic was ambiguity rather
than context-dependence, but their arguments are easily adapted.1
In effect, then, what premise (iv) asserts is that no systematic theory is
possible of how context affects what proposition is expressed by the utterance
of a given sentence.2 If not, then there are going to be lots of context-
dependent expressions whose characters we cannot specify, even in principle.
But that, or so said premise (iii), was what we had to be able to do if we were
to assign truth-condtions to utterances. So semantic theory is impossible,
and that is the conclusion of the argument.
1After giving a few examples, Katz and Fodor (1963, p. 178) claim that it is “an easy
matter to construct an ambiguous sentence whose resolution requires the representation of
practically any item of information about the world. . . ”.
2Pagin and Pelletier (2007) clearly identify this as the central issue.
3This ‘anti-semantic’ argument has attracted a lot of attention in the last
several years, from both friends and foes of semantics. What is perhaps most
striking is the way the argument has split the friends of semantics, and the
sectarian battles have been bloody indeed. Some philosophers have denied
(i), arguing that semantics is interested only in context-independent aspects
of meaning (Bach, 2004b). Other philosophers have denied (ii), arguing that,
excepting only the most obvious cases, sentences do have truth-conditions
(Cappelen and Lepore, 2005). The view that seems to be most popular denies
(iv), on the ground that the considerations offered in its favor show only
that it is very hard to say how context affects what is said, not that it is
impossible (Stanley, 2007). And, while the friends of semantics squabble,
the enemies of semantics point to the squabbling as yet further evidence of
the bankruptcy of the entire enterprise. It doesn’t help that all three of the
options mentioned have serious problems of their own, which defenders of
the others are all too happy to point out.
I am going to argue here that this entire debate is unnecessary, because
the anti-semantic argument around which it revolves equivocates at a crucial
point.3 There is a sense in which (iii) is true, and there is a sense in which
(iii) is false. In the sense in which it is true, it does indeed follow from (i)
and (ii); but, in that sense, it does not conflict with (iv); only in the sense in
which it is false does it conflict with (iv), but then, in that sense, it does not
follow from (i) and (ii). So (i), (ii), and (iv) are all true, but they do not entail
any anti-semantic conclusion.
Only a fool would try to make this argument in full generality. Fortu-
nately, there is another way to proceed. What I am going to argue is that, if
the anti-semantic argument works at all, then it works even if we restrict
it to the case of demonstrative utterances, bracketing all other sources of
context-dependence. In this restricted case, the question how context affects
what is said reduces to the question how context determines the referent of
an uttered demonstrative.4 Premise (iv) then becomes:
(iv′) Only a theory that incorporated a complete theory of human rationality
could assign a reference to an uttered demonstrative.
It should be clear that (iv′) contradicts (iii) if (iv) does. So, in that sense,
the restriction to demonstratives only makes the anti-semantic argument
stronger, if (iv′) can indeed be defended.
One might think it fairly obvious that (iv′) is false. There is a large litera-
ture on the question how context fixes the value of an uttered demonstrative;
the options are well-known, and they have been explored in depth. In fact,
however, I think that (iv′) is not false but true. And if we can establish
(iv′), then we will have established, as I said earlier, that the anti-semantic
3Of course, there could be other motivations for, say, semantic minimalism, and the
arguments here will not address them, if such there be. But, in practice, such views are
motivated by the suspicion that we cannot accept all the premises of the anti-semantic
argument.
4If one thinks, as I sometimes do (Heck, 2002), that uttered demonstratives have sense as
well as reference, then the problem that context must solve becomes even harder. So ignoring
the Fregean option will not prejudice the discussion.
4argument need not have considered fancy cases involving quantifiers, color
words, and the like, but could simply have focused on demonstratives. But
demonstratives, I shall further argue, do not pose a threat to semantic theory,
so there has to be something wrong with the anti-semantic argument. What
is wrong with it will emerge from our discussion of demonstratives: The
same muddle that is responsible for the equivocation at the heart of the
anti-semantic argument is present in the literature on how context fixes the
reference of an uttered demonstrative; it is, in a sense, responsible for that
literature, which I therefore regard as confused. But it will be some time
before it will become clear what that might mean.
The plan for the paper is thus as follows. In Section 1, I shall quickly
sketch the current state of the literature just mentioned, so as to explain how
the dominant ways of approaching demonstratives emerged. The promised
discussion of demonstratives is in Section 2, whose central purpose is to argue
for a view close in spirit to one Sir Peter Strawson famously expresses in “On
Referring”: Words do not refer, but people use words to refer. In Section 3, I
consider a series of objections to that view. The most important of these will
return us to the very general issues we have just been discussing. Indeed,
Strawson himself famously believed, at least early in his career,5 that the
‘logical approach to language’ that he found in Russell was incompatible with
a proper appreciation of the insight just mentioned, and many contemporary
philosophers seem to harbor similar suspicions. We shall therefore have to
work quite hard to show that the Strawsonian view has little if any bearing
upon the prospects of natural language semantics and, in particular, that it
poses no threat to the semantics–pragmatics distinction. Finally, in Section
4, I identify a problem left unresolved by the present discussion and suggest
an approach to it. Before we begin, though, a warning and a clarification.
First, the warning. We are going to be concerned here with questions
about ‘what is said’ when a given sentence is uttered under certain circum-
stances. It is important to appreciate that questions about ‘what is said’
are not questions about indirect speech reports.6 I am not interested in
how other speakers would report what someone ‘said’ by uttering a given
sentence. I am not even interested in how they might correctly report what
had been ‘said’. What is at issue here is a question about the content of
utterances. There is no particular reason to believe that a sentence of the
form “N said that S” can be uttered truly only if N made an utterance whose
content, on that occasion, was the same as the content of the sentence S
when it is uttered as part of “N said that S”. Indeed, there are excellent
reasons to think no such strict relationship need obtain. In brief: The notion
of what is said is a theoretical notion, one that is intended to play a central
role in a general theory of language and its use; there is no reason to think
that this notion is expressed by any word of ordinary language, let alone by
the English verb “to say”. How this notion should properly be characterized
5This thought surfaces most strongly in Introduction to Logical Theory (Strawson, 1952).
Strawson expresses a more conciliatory view in “Meaning and Truth” (Strawson, 1971).
6The sorts of points I am making here have been made at length by Cappelen and Lepore
(1997). I have made similar points myself about belief and belief-attribution (Heck, 2002, p.
3).
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is, of course, an important question, and my remarks here do bear upon
it. But, thankfully, it is not essential for our purposes that we answer this
question in advance.
Second, the clarification. There is no established use of the word “context”
either in semantics or in philosophy of language. I need therefore to clarify
how I intend to use the word. So: When I use the word “context”, I do not have
any technical notion in mind. On the contrary, when I speak of ‘dependence
upon context’, what I mean is dependence upon the circumstances in which
an utterance is made. This is a wholly intuitive notion.
Many of the technical notions of context that one finds in the literature
are representations of context in my sense. They are attempts to extract
what we might call the ‘relevant features’ of the context, so as to make the
way in which context determines what is said theoretically tractable. My
view is that, at least as concerns demonstratives, but probably as concerns
context-dependence generally, this project is hopeless. As I have already
said, I strongly suspect that absolutely any fact about the circumstances
in which an utterance is made could prove relevant to the determination of
what was said. So a context, in this theoretical sense, can be nothing smaller
than a (centered) possible world. And there is, or so I shall be suggesting,
no prospect of our explaining how the possible world in which an utterance
is made fixes its content. That would require a complete theory of human
rationality.
There are other technical notions of context one encounters, in which a
context is nothing like a representation of the surroundings but is, rather,
a representation of the effects that context has on interpretation. I have in
mind, for example, ‘indices’, in the sense in which Lewis (1998) uses that
term. So far as the present issue is concerned, I have no objection to the
use of such a formal tool. If one wants to use such a tool, then the issue I
want to discuss is whether it is a critical, or even sensible, question how the
circumstances in which an utterance is made (which is what Lewis calls a
‘context’) fix the indices. I say that the theory of language does not require
us to answer any such question. That is not to say that the psychological
question how speakers fix the referents of demonstratives might not be worth
investigating. Indeed, I am sure it is. It is simply to say that it is a question
for psychology, not for semantics.7
1 A Brief History of Semantics
Semantics is a child of the revolution in modern logic that Frege instigated.
It is therefore no surprise that, for its first several decades, semantics
developed without any real attention to the effects of context on meaning.
There were, to be sure, squeaky wheels to be heard complaining about the
omission. But the initial idealization had to be made; progress would have
been impossible without it. And it was not long before serious attention was
paid to the more obvious forms of context-dependence. As a result of work
7Or for a different part of psychology if, like me, you think semantics is part of linguistics,
and linguistics is part of psychology.
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by Montague, Lewis, Kaplan, and many, many others, a framework for the
incorporation of context-dependence into semantics emerged. Sentences, on
this now dominant view, do not express propositions. Rather, they express
propositions only relative to a context, which is supposed to supply ‘values’
for contextual parameters. The values of the parameters then participate in
compositional operations, eventually yielding the proposition expressed.
This picture is most natural when applied to so-called ‘pure indexicals’,
such as “I”. In this case, it is (at least plausibly) a rule of English that an
utterance of “I” refers to its utterer. So, although the language itself does
not determine to whom a given utterance of “I” refers, the language and the
circumstances in which the utterance is made, taken together, do determine
to whom that utterance of “I” refers. There is a sense, then, in which the fact
that a particular utterance of “I” refers to me is still an objective fact about
my language, even if it is not a purely linguistic fact: Given the facts about
the circumstances in which an utterance of “I” was made, the facts about my
language determine to whom it refers.
Demonstratives are different, at least in so far as there is no simple rule
that determines the reference of an uttered demonstrative. Nonetheless,
many philosophers have supposed that there simply must be some rule that
determines to what an uttered demonstrative refers. At least, there must be
some such rule if facts about the reference of an uttered demonstrative are
to be semantic facts: facts that affect ‘what is said’ by someone who utters
a sentence containing a demonstrative. This attitude derives, it seems to
me, from an old and venerable tradition according to which the ‘semantic’
features of an utterance are those that are determined by the rules of the
language. Thus, when attempting to give some explanation of his proprietary
notion of ‘what is said’, Grice (1989, p. 25) writes: “In the sense in which I
am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be closely related
to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered”. As
it happens, Grice is prepared to allow the resolution of context-dependence
to affect what is said. Montague (1974) was not: He regarded the semantic
features of an expression as including only those that are wholly determined
by features of the language to which it belongs. This way of distinguishing
semantics from pragmatics is no longer as popular as it once was (King and
Stanley, 2004, §1), but its influence nonetheless continues to be felt. Or so I
will be arguing.
There are two familiar sorts of answers to the question how the reference
of a demonstrative is fixed by the context. Both of these were introduced
into the literature by Kaplan, in his discussion of the following now famous
example from his paper “Dthat”:
Suppose that without turning and looking I point to the place
on my wall which has long been occupied by a picture of Rudolf
Carnap and I say: [That] is a picture of one of the greatest philoso-
phers of the twentieth century. But unbeknownst to me, someone
has replaced my picture of Carnap with one of Spiro Agnew. I
think it would simply be wrong to argue an “ambiguity” in the
demonstration, so great that it can be bent to my intended demon-
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stratum. I have said of a picture of Spiro Agnew that it pictures
one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. And my
speech and demonstration suggest no other natural interpreta-
tion. (Kaplan, 1978, p. 239)
So there are two views under discussion. The first, which Kaplan is rejecting,
is that the reference of the demonstrative is fixed by the intentions of the
speaker; the second, which Kaplan is endorsing, is that it is fixed by what
I shall call ‘contextual cues’, that is, by various aspects of the environment
in which the utterance is made, such as: a pointing gesture, or other sort of
‘demonstration’; by what is ‘salient’ in the environment; and so on and so
forth.
What I am going to argue is that neither of these views should be accepted,
because there is no such problem as the one to which they are offered as a
solution. The question was supposed to be: How is the referent of an uttered
demonstrative fixed by the circumstances in which the utterance is made?
But, to put my view as radically as possible, I do not think there is any such
thing as ‘the referent of an uttered demonstrative’; uttered demonstratives
do not refer at all.8
To put the point less radically: I see no reason to believe that the facts
about the semantics of English together with the facts about the environ-
ment in which a demonstrative expression is uttered do, as Kaplan assumes,
conspire to fix a referent for the uttered demonstrative. What I believe
instead is very much in the spirit of Strawson (1950, p. 326): that uttered
demonstratives do not refer, but that speakers use demonstratives to refer;
or again, that, if the reference of an uttered demonstrative is fixed by any-
thing, it is fixed not by the context but by the conversational participants.
Better still, what happens when a demonstrative is uttered is that each of
the conversational participants will interpret the uttered demonstrative as
referring to some object, and will regard himself as having failed to under-
stand the utterance if he is unable to settle upon such an object. Successful
communication, in such a scenario, then minimally requires that the con-
versational participants should converge upon a single object as referent of
the demonstrative. If they do, then we may reasonably say that the uttered
demonstrative refers to the object on which they converged. But if they
do not converge, then, or so I shall be arguing, there will in general be no
answer to the question: To what did the uttered demonstrative actually
refer? Some of the conversational participants will have taken it to refer to
one thing; some, to another. But there is no objective standard that would
permit us to say, “This person had it right; that person had it wrong”.
It is important to understand the dialectical significance of this claim.
The two views Kaplan discusses in “Dthat” can only be distinguished by
cases in which they come apart. If there were no such cases, there would be
no debate. Cases like the Carnap–Agnew case are supposed to be such cases:
8The view for which I shall be arguing is similar in many ways to views for which Kent
Bach has been arguing for several years now. See, in particular, his paper “Context ex
Machina” (Bach, 2004a). But there are also important differences between our views, which
shall emerge below.
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ones in which the object to which the speaker intends to refer is different
from the one the ‘contexual cues’ plausibly determine as the referent. It takes
only a little thought—though I shall return to the point later—to see that
judgements about what the ‘contextual cues’ determine are really judgements
about what a suitably attentive person (one who was appropriately aware of
the relevant features of the surrounding context) would take the referent to
be. If so, then the question which of the two views Kaplan mentions should
be preferred just is the question whether the speaker or her audience is
correct, and the claim that there is no objective standard that determines
who is right implies that neither of Kaplan’s two views is right. That makes
the problem that Kaplan introduced a pseudo-problem.
As will emerge, and as may be obvious from my continual use of scare
quotes, my view is a good deal closer to the speaker’s intention view than it
is to the ‘contextual cues’ view. But my view is not a version of the speaker’s
intention view—not, at least, as that view is normally understood. The
view that Kaplan rejects in “Dthat”, but later endorses in “Afterthoughts”
(Kaplan, 1989a, pp. 582ff), says that it is the speaker’s intention that fixes
the reference of an uttered demonstrative. Kaplan thus is presupposing that,
given a particular sentence of natural language, uttered under particular
circumstances, there is some proposition that the sentence expresses relative
to the context of utterance; the question is supposed to be what determines
which proposition this is; the answer is supposed to be: the speaker’s inten-
tions. I mean to be rejecting the question, because I reject its presupposition:
Sentences, on the view I want to defend, do not express propositions, even
relative to the circumstances in which they are made. Rather, an uttered
sentence will be understood by each of the conversational participants as
expressing a particular proposition. The speaker utters the sentence, in part,
because she understands it as expressing a certain proposition; the members
of her audience will understand it as expressing possibly different propo-
sitions; and successful communication is, to first approximation, a matter
of everyone’s associating the same proposition with the uttered sentence.
Which proposition a particular person understands an uttered sentence to
express is, in part, a function of how she understands her language—that
is the context-independent bit—and, in part, a function of what values she
assigns to the contextual parameters. The critical point is again in the
spirit of Strawson: It is not context that assigns values to the contextual
parameters, but language-users.
I now proceed to argue for this position.
2 Demonstratives
Kaplan’s semantics for demonstratives, introduced and developed in his now
classic paper by that name (Kaplan, 1989b), incorporates a sort of move that
has become quite common. Faced with a completely intractable problem—in
this case, what fixes the proposition expressed by an utterance containing
a demonstrative—Kaplan separates the problem into a managable bit and
an only slightly less intractable bit. The managable bit is found in Kaplan’s
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theory of content: An uttered demonstrative, on Kaplan’s account, has as
its content an object, and standard compositional operations then yield the
proposition expressed. The unmanagable bit is, at least in “Demonstratives”,
consigned to the theory of character. The character of the demonstrative
“that” was to be a function from contexts to contents (that is, objects). And so
the problem that remained was to figure out which function that was.
This division does not, however, depend upon the details of Kaplan’s own
framework. A different approach would take the semantic clause governing
the word “that” to entail facts of the following form:9
If u is an utterance of the sentence “that is F”, and if the word
“that” uttered as part of u refers to x, then u is true iff x satisfies
the predicate F.
Very roughly, of course. The question to what the word “that” does refer on
any given occasion is simply set aside, in much the way Tarski sets aside the
question what sentences mean so as to focus on the notion of truth. Thus,
Tarski tells us that an adequate theory of truth for a language L must imply,
for each sentence S ∈ L, a theorem of the form:
S is true iff p,
where p translates S. But Tarski does not even begin to analyze the notion
of translation, and for his purposes he does not need to do so. Similarly, I am
suggesting, an account of the semantics of demonstratives need not tell us
how the semantic value of a demonstrative is fixed. Semantics must tell us
how the semantic properties of an utterance are determined by the semantic
properties of its significant parts, as well as what sorts of semantic properties
the parts have. But to do that, it need not tell us how it is determined exactly
which semantic properties the parts do have. That is as true when the parts
are context-dependent expressions as it is when they are not. No one would
suppose it part of the job of semantics to tell us how it is determined what
“snow” means. The important question for semantics is how mass terms
function, for example, how the meaning of an expression like “some snow”
is determined. There is no more reason, so far as I can see, to suppose that
semantics must tell us what determines that a particular utterance of “that”
refers to whatever it does. It is enough for semantics to tell us that “that”
refers to an object.
But whether or not semantics proper is supposed to answer it, the ques-
tion Kaplan’s semantics for demonstratives leaves unanswered can still
seem important: How is the reference of a demonstrative fixed by the circum-
stances in which it is uttered?10 The question is particularly important to
9King (2001) has argued that complex demonstratives, such as “that dog”, are not refer-
ential but quantificational expressions, and a similar view might be suggested for simple
demonstratives. This question does not matter here, however, since demonstratives are still
context-dependent on King’s view, so similar questions will arise.
10In some sense, it is obvious that semantic theory need not tell us what the referent of an
uttered demonstrative is on any given occasion of use. Semantic theory proper knows nothing
about the circumstances of use. The most one can hope is that the semantic theory will tell
us how to determine the referent, given an appropriate specification of the circumstances.
That is Kaplan’s hope.
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Kaplan, since character is intended as a refinement of the intuitive notion of
linguistic meaning, that is, of what a word means in the language to which
it belongs. That is to say, the character of “that” is the meaning of the word
“that”, so we need to specify a function from contexts to contents in order
to specify the meaning of the word “that”. And, as already noted, Kaplan
identifies two options. On the first, the reference of the demonstrative is fixed
by contextual cues, the sorts of objective features of the situation in which
the utterance is made that someone who heard that utterance might use to
assign a value to the uttered demonstrative. On the second, the reference is
fixed by the speaker’s intention: If the speaker intends to refer to x, then her
utterance will refer to x, even if she points at something other than x.
The question which of these views should be preferred has been much
discussed, and various sorts of intermediate views have also emerged.11 But
my view, as I have said, is that the question with which Kaplan saddles
us is a bad question. It can have no satisfactory answer, because the very
asking of it reflects a failure to appreciate something fundamental about
how context-dependent expressions work.
Let me first say a few words about the ‘contextual cue’ view. Part of the
difficulty with this view is that no one, so far as I am aware, has ever been
able to say, with any precision at all, which features of the environment in
which an utterance is made count as ‘contextual cues’ nor how they conspire
to determine reference. Some early writers put a good deal of emphasis upon
pointing. I seem to recall someone’s even suggesting that we should trace a
line from the end of the fingertip and see which object it first intersects. It
is obvious upon minimal reflection, however, that pointing is unnecessary
for demonstrative reference to succeed. Other sorts of gestures can do
just as well—people without arms can refer demonstratively—and in many
cases, no gesture at all is necessary. It is therefore common nowadays to
think of ‘demonstrations’ as a means of bringing an object to ‘salience’, and
salience is then taken to be the key to demonstrative reference: An uttered
demonstrative is supposed to refer to the object that is most salient when
the utterance is made.
One immediate problem is that there are plenty of sentences that contain
more than one demonstrative. For example, suppose you and your partner
bump into two friends, one of whom is wearing a stunning new necklace.
Your partner whispers,12 “She gave her that for her birthday”. This sen-
tence contains three demonstratives. It obviously isn’t the case that each
demonstrative in the sentence must refer to the same thing. Since there is
no upper bound on the number of demonstratives that can be contained in
a sentence, we will therefore need something like an infinite sequence of
salient objects.13 How are these to be related to the particular demonstra-
11The place to begin, for anyone interested in this debate, are two early papers by Reimer
(1991; 1992). The literature grows quickly thereafter.
12And does so before you have said anything to them or about them, if ‘discourse context’
seems to you to be important.
13Alternatively, one could suppose that the context changed as each of the demonstratives
was uttered. This sort of maneuver is important when dealing with sentences like “It is cold
here, but it is warm here”, said as one walks from one room to another, but, for reasons that
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tives whose references they are? It isn’t as if the most salient object will
always go with the first demonstrative, and so forth.14 It really isn’t clear
what the friends of salience should say here. Still, this is a technical sort
of problem, and technical sorts of problems tend to have technical sorts of
solutions. But there are more serious difficulties, as we are about to see.
There are two observations about the notion of salience that are worth
making right away. First, salience is not an objective notion. What is ‘salient’
is always salient to someone, and what is salient to you may not be salient
to me.15 More importantly, if what is salient determines demonstrative
reference, then what is salient cannot be independent of the sentence that is
uttered. What is salient will depend upon the meanings of the other words in
the uttered sentence, and how it depends upon them will itself depend upon
psychological facts about the conversational participants. This can easily be
seen by considering the following sort of example.16
Two friends are sitting in the bleachers watching an impressive
performance by the local drill corps. Just as one soldier begins the
most impressive feat of all, a soldier at the other end of the line
makes himself salient by fainting. One of the friends remarks,
“He must have been up late”.
There is no clear sense in which the soldier who fainted is, simpliciter,
salient. Suppose, for example, that the sentence uttered had been “He’s
obviously done a lot of practicing”. Then it might have been perfectly obvious
to everyone concerned that the demonstrative referred to the impressive
performer, despite the fainting. But since the speaker did in fact say “He
must have been up late”, it is natural to take her to have referred to the
soldier who fainted. Which person is salient therefore depends, as was said,
upon which sentence is uttered—and not upon its syntactic features but
upon its semantic features. It is also worth noting, though the point may
seem but a curiosity at the moment, that the object to which the uttered
demonstrative refers need not become salient until the complete sentence in
which the demonstrative is contained has been uttered. In this particular
case, for example, had the word “practicing” been followed by, say, the words
“to fall on cue like that”, then it would again have been the soldier who
fainted who was most salient.
We do not even have to change the uttered sentence to get this kind of
result. It is easy to add information to our description of the case so that the
remark “He must have been up late” would naturally be taken to refer to the
performing soldier. We might suppose, for example, that he is well-known to
the two friends, that his performance is way better than any he has given
will emerge shortly, I doubt that it will help in the present case.
14Your partner might have said, “That was her birthday present from her”. (There are six
options for order.)
15This point is also emphasized by Mount (2008, p. 144), whose overall perspective on
these issues is close to mine. Unfortunately, I became aware of her paper only after I’d written
this one.
16This example is apparently due to Kaplan, though I cannot locate a source for it and do
not recall where I learned it.
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before and, indeed, far better than he had done in the rehearsal yesterday,
and that the guy who fainted does so with some regularity. Then what was
said would clearly be that the impressive soldier must have been up late
practicing to do so well today.
Here is another case, one that has the virtue of being an actual case.
Some years ago, I was driving with my friend ‘Steve’ following a pleasant
lunch out. About twenty minutes after we left the restaurant, Steve said,
just ‘out of the blue’, “She was gorgeous”. I knew immediately to whom
he was referring: the hostess at the restaurant where we’d just had lunch,
whom I shall call Sarah, and who looked as if she’d just arrived from a Vogue
photo shoot.
If salience is the key to demonstrative reference, then we need to under-
stand how Sarah became salient. She was in no way salient to me before
Steve’s remark—though apparently she was to him. I might never have
thought of her again had Steve not said what he did. Nor was she in any
way part of the ‘discoure context’: She had not previously been mentioned by
either of us, even when we were at the restaurant. And for that same reason,
if one wanted to think of demonstrative reference as involving the selection
of an object from some set of candidates for demonstrative reference, then I
do not think Sarah was any more a candidate than hundreds of other people
were.
Sarah only became salient to me because of what Steve said—and only,
again, after he said what he said. And, so far as I can see, there is simply
no sense to be made of the idea that she was objectively salient once he had
spoken. As I said, I knew immediately to whom Steve was referring, but that
is because I’d been at lunch with him, and I too had noticed how strikingly
beautiful Sarah was—something he expected me to have noticed. But of
course, it is not at all essential that she actually was gorgeous. I would have
known just as well to whom he was referring had it just been clear that he
was smitten by her. Or she might have been the sort of woman to whom I
knew he was particularly likely to be attracted. And that might have been
because of her hair color, her dress, the way she carried herself or spoke, or
even the sort of car she drove. There are ever so many ways of modifying
the example, and it’s really just a matter of imagination to bring almost any
factor you like into play. So it was only because of what I knew about Steve
that I was able to discover to whom he was referring, and it’s only because of
what he knew about me that he was able to communicate with me as he did.
One lesson to be drawn from this example, then, is that ‘contextual cues’
can be anything, which is to say that there really isn’t any sharp notion here
at all.17 Almost any fact about the circumstances in which an utterance is
17These reflections lead naturally to the idea, familiar from the work of Stalnaker (1999a),
that contexts should be modeled in terms of the ‘common ground’ of a conversation. In that
case, what I am denying is that we need or even can have an account of how the references of
demonstratives are determined by the common ground as it is prior to an utterance’s being
understood. (Once the utterance has been understood, it will be part of the common ground,
e.g., that Steve was referring to Sarah.) Not that Stalnaker would disagree. His goal is
“to redirect attention from the details of the devices and mechanisms of particular natural
languages to the general structure of the practices in which natural languages are used to
serve the ends of speakers and listeners” (Stalnaker, 1999c, p. 112), and so “to reduce the
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made could prove relevant to the determination of demonstrative reference.
It is, as I said, just a matter of one’s having sufficient imagination to come
up with an appropriate sort of example.18
One might think this kind of case unusual. But it is actually very common.
Some time ago, I was at the aquarium with my daughter when she said,
“That’s a pretty fish”. I looked up and there, high in the corner, was a
beautiful blue and yellow fish. I then knew to which fish she’d referred, and
I knew it every bit as surely as if she had pointed directly at that fish. It
wasn’t that it was the most beautiful fish in the tank—though it might have
been, and then that would be a different example. In this case, rather, what
led me to the right fish was the fact that I knew that this was a fish that
Isobel, in particular, would think was pretty. Had it been someone else who’d
made the remark—one of a group of tourists, say—I might have had no idea
to which creature they’d referred. It therefore seems to me to follow that, if
there is a coherent notion of salience to be had at all, it is not one that can be
characterized except in terms of what the conversational participants know
about one another. If Isobel had hated blue fish but loved orange ones, I’d
have understood her differently.
The cue view is motivated by cases like Kaplan’s example, cases in
which we are inclined to say that the object to which the speaker in fact
referred was not the object to which she had intended to refer. As Kaplan
puts it, when he points behind him and says “That is a picture of one
of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century”, his “speech and
demonstration suggest no other natural interpretation” than one on which
he said, of the picture of Agnew, that it is a picture of a famous philosopher
(Kaplan, 1978, p. 239). But this remark begs the question to whom this
interpretation is suggested. And the answer must surely be that it is the
interpretation that would seem natural to Kaplan’s (imagined) audience.
That is to say: Our judgements about what the ‘cues’ fix as the referent are
judgements made from the perspective of an imagined audience. But even
in this sort of case, our judgements are malleable. Suppose, for example,
that it was common knowledge between Kaplan and his audience that the
picture of Carnap had been replaced. In that case, he might point behind
himself and say, “That picture meant a lot to me”, and then he would have
said, of the picture of Carnap, that it meant a lot to him.19 I do this kind
of thing myself all the time. I write something on the blackboard and then
erase it, only later to realize I still need it. And then, rather than re-write
it, I’ll say, pointing to where the relevant sentence used to be, “That is the
crucial premise in this argument”. And my students know perfectly well
which sentence I mean.20
burden on semantics by explaining as much of the phenomena as possible in terms of truisms
about conversation as a rational activity. . . ” (Stalnaker, 1999c, p. 113). The present paper is
similarly motivated.
18As mentioned earlier, this point was made by Katz and Fodor (1963) a long time ago.
19Mount (2008, pp. 152ff) discusses some similar cases.
20One might try to account for the communicative facts by suggesting that I merely
implicate that sentence S is the crucial premise. But my students might argue with me by
saying, “No, it isn’t”, and it is a common observation that one cannot deny mere implicatures
that way. For example, if Jones says that there’s a gas station around the corner, implicating
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One might want to deny that the last two examples really are exam-
ples of demonstrative reference, on the ground that they involve what is
called ‘deferred ostension’. The object to which reference is made is not
actually present. But why should that imply that these are not examples of
demonstrative reference? Certainly, neither the speaker nor the audience in
such a case has what Evans (1982, ch. 6) would have called a ‘demonstra-
tive thought’ about the referent. So far as language is concerned, however,
‘demonstrative reference’ is just reference via demonstratives, that is, via
words like “this” and “that”, and it is nowhere near obvious that making or
understanding a demonstrative reference always requires having a demon-
strative thought.21 Nor can one simply assume that deferred ostension is
somehow exceptional. Indeed, the view that deferred ostension is exceptional
seems hard to justify without the prior assumption that ostension is some-
how essential to demonstrative reference.22 But that view has long been
discredited, and it should be clear on reflection that both the ‘contexual cues’
view and the speaker’s intention view can happily regard cases involving
deferred ostension as genuine cases of demonstrative reference.
If I am right that our judgements about what the ‘contextual cues’ deter-
mine as the referent are, in effect, judgements made from the standpoint
of the imagined audience, then it follows that the debate between the cue
view and the speaker’s intention view is necessarily focused on cases of
miscommunication.23 Any case in which the two views disagree will be one
in which the object to which the speaker intends to refer is not the object
the imagined audience would ‘naturally’ identify as the referent. So such
a case is a case of miscommunication. But it seems very odd methodology
to construct one’s theory of how demonstrative reference works by focusing
on cases where it fails to work as it should. Surely it would be better to
develop our theory of how demonstrative utterances function by looking at
what happens when they function properly, and what is required for them to
do so.24
I will not try to say here exactly what successful communication requires.
But I am attracted to the following sort of picture.25 Speech is a variety of
intentional action, which is to say that people generally speak for reasons.
That is, people utter the sentences they do to accomplish certain ends, and an
utterance’s appropriateness to one’s end generally depends upon its semantic
properties (as well as upon its syntactic and phonological ones). For example,
suppose I want to let Chris know that Dave has gone home. One way I
might attempt to accomplish this goal is to utter the sentence, “Dave’s gone
home”. But this will make sense only if I assume that Chris will understand
me, that is, that he will interpret me as having said that Dave has gone
that it is open, Smith cannot deny that it is open by saying, “No, you’re wrong”.
21This observation undermines some of the examples King (2001, ch. 1) uses to argue that
complex demonstratives are not referring expressions.
22Mount (2008, §6) argues for a similar conclusion.
23Something like this point is also made by Evans (1982, pp. 317–20).
24Of course, that is not to say that it might be helpful here to compare successful uses
with unsuccessful ones. As, indeed, we will do, to some extent.
25I have attempted to develop this sort of view of communication elsewhere (Heck, 2002,
2006, 2007). Related ideas can be found in work by Ian Rumfitt (1995).
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home. That is, on my view, Chris will understand me only if he regards me
as having spoken the literal truth if, and only if, Dave has gone home.26
So my reasons for speaking as I do include my expectations about how I
will be understood or interpreted. And something similar can be said about
Chris’s side of the exchange. That he comes to believe (and perhaps even to
know) that Dave has gone home clearly depends upon his appreciation of the
semantic properties of my utterance, that is, upon his understanding of what
I have said: Chris must regard me as having spoken the literal truth if, and
only if, Dave has gone home. Successful communication, in such cases, thus
depends, minimally, upon agreement between the speaker and her audience
about how the utterance is to be interpreted.
Demonstrative utterances are similar. Suppose I see Chris walking
towards Dave’s office and say, “He’s gone home”. Here again, I do so with
the expectation that Chris will regard me as having spoken the literal truth
if, and only if, Dave has gone home. So I expect, inter alia, that Chris
will regard me as having intended that he would interpret my utterance
of the demonstrative “he” as referring to Dave. So, minimally, successful
communication that makes use of demonstratives requires that the speaker
and her audience converge upon a referent.27
If that is to happen, then there is work to be done on both sides. Let’s
suppose that the speaker wants her audience to come to believe, of some
object O, that it is dangerous. Her plan for accomplishing this goal is to utter
the sentence “That is dangerous”, expecting (a) that her audience will regard
her as having spoken truly if, and only if, O is dangerous and (b) that they
will suppose she is speaking truly, and so (c) that they will conclude that,
indeed, O is dangerous. The speaker is thus presuming that her audience
knows a good deal about the words she intends to utter, for example, that
the word “dangerous” is true of dangerous things. But, for our purposes,
the crucial expectation concerns the demonstrative: She expects that her
audience will interpret her as speaking, in uttering it, about O. And she
knows, moreover, that her audience will not typically be able to discern
this intention telepathically. Rather, her audience will have to rely upon
‘contextual cues’ to help them identify the object about which she wishes
to speak. So it is in the speaker’s interest to ensure that her audience will
be able to work out to which object she means to refer. Indeed, she cannot
26Of course, I must also suppose that Chris will regard me as having spoken truly, but
that is of no concern at present.
27I keep saying “minimally” not just because there might be other conditions but because I
think there are: I think that successful communication requires the speaker and her audience
knowingly to converge. In particular, I think it needs to be common knowledge between me
and Chris that we are both interpreting me as having spoken the literal truth iff Dave has
gone home, at least if there is to be a possibility that Chris might come to know that Dave
has gone home. But such additional conditions will not matter here.
One might worry, however, that even known convergence is not sufficient. Imagine getting
an email saying, “That tree died”, and then spending ten minutes trying to figure out which
tree the speaker meant. (Thanks to Randall Rose for the example.) Even if one does eventually
figure it out, it might not seem as if communication has been very successful in this case.
But here we need to distinguish questions. Eventually, the speaker was understood, and so
in that sense communication eventually succeeded. But the speaker did not communicate
effectively, since there was a long period during which she was not understood.
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hope to communicate successfully with her audience unless she ensures that
they will be able to identify her intended referent. This, then, is the work
the speaker must do: She must ensure that the circumstances in which
she makes her utterance will be ones in which her intended audience can
determine to which object she means to refer.
Let me repeat that observation, because it is critically important: If one
is successfully to communicate using a demonstrative, then one will often
have to take steps to ensure that one’s audience can determine to which
object one means to refer; but, by the same token, one need do no more than
is required to make it possible for one’s intended audience to discover one’s
intended referent. It should therefore be no surprise that both how much
and what kind of work one needs to do will vary enormously from case to
case. A few conclusions are immediate. First, we see why pointing has no
special role. Pointing at an object can bring it to the audience’s attention and
thus lead them to consider it as a possible referent, and that may be enough
for them to identify it as the intended referent. But nodding or waving in
the general direction of the object can serve the same sort of purpose, as can
pointing to where the object was five minutes ago. And no pointing need
be required. It isn’t just that the object may already be ‘salient’, though it
may well be. The simpler point is that the audience just might not need that
kind of help. What help they need will depend upon the circumstances of the
case, and there is no limit whatsoever to the sorts of things one can exploit
to draw attention to the object about which one wants to speak. That is why
absolutely anything can count as a ‘contextual cue’.
Note further that the speaker need only make her referential intentions
available to her intended audience. It is easy to imagine cases where someone
might do just that and so purposely conceal her intentions from others who
might overhear her words. But in the normal case, it seems to me, one
does not purposely conceal one’s intentions and yet one will often do too
little to allow an arbitrary third party to discern one’s intentions. This is
precisely what happens in the fish case I mentioned above: I knew which
fish Isobel meant, but no one else would have. That is fine, because she was
talking to me, and it was of no consequence to her whether anyone else might
understand her. The same point applies to the conversation about Sarah,
and examples are easily multiplied. It should therefore be clear that, in a
very large number of ordinary cases of demonstrative reference, an arbitrary
third party would be hopelessly lost. And why not?
The audience has its own work to do. The audience needs to interpret
the speaker’s words, that is—focusing just on the demonstrative—to fill in
the dots in: So-and-so spoke truly iff . . . is dangerous. If the members of
the audience are interested in communicating successfully with the speaker,
then the question they must ask themselves is therefore: Which object did
the speaker expect I would understand her to be speaking about? Or, if you
like: To which object did the speaker mean to refer? The question—assuming
that it is a different question—is very much not: To what did the uttered
demonstrative refer? If the answers to the two questions can come apart,
why should you, as a party to the conversation, care whether the ‘objective’
referent diverges from the one the speaker intended? If you manage to
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determine to which object the speaker intended to refer, then the two of
you will have converged on a referent, and there is no reason I can see to
suppose that you will not then have communicated successfully, even if the
object on which you have converged is not the one to which the uttered
demonstrative ‘really’ refers. If so, however, then your failure to converge on
the ‘objective’ referent is of no consequence, and so the ‘objective’ referent is
of no consequence, either.28
Undeniably, then, contextual cues have an important role to play in com-
munication via demonstratives, but their role is secondary to the speaker’s
intention. Successful communication requires the speaker and her audience
to converge on a referent. But the speaker does not utter the demonstrative
and then consult the contexual cues to figure out how to interpret her own
words.29 Rather, in planning her speech, she has already decided what object
to assign as value of the contextual parameter that fixes the referent of the
demonstrative, that is, which object she intends her audience to interpret
her as speaking about. It is up to her audience, if they wish to acquire
information from her, to figure out which object that is. Of course, as we
have seen, if the speaker wishes to communicate with her audience, then
she will need to ensure that they can figure out which object she wants to
talk about. But the point is that the question the audience must ask is, from
the outset, to what the speaker intended to refer. It follows that contextual
cues are used as a guide to the speaker’s intention.
That is why the notion of salience both seems like it ought to be useful
and yet in the end is so useless. When Steve had finished speaking, Sarah
was indeed salient. But in what respect was she salient? Only as someone
Steve might have wanted to say was gorgeous. So the variety of salience that
matters cannot even be characterized except in terms of the intentions with
which we speak.
All of this might seem like an argument for the speaker’s intention view.
I have argued, after all, that the speaker’s referential intentions do have a
certain sort of primacy. Nonetheless, I do not want to say that the reference
of an uttered demonstrative is determined by the speaker’s intention. I do
not want to state my view that way, because, as I have said, I reject the
question to which the speaker’s intention view is supposed to be an answer.
To repeat, that question is motivated by examples like Kaplan’s, in which
the object to which the speaker intends to refer differs from the object to
which her audience might reasonably take her to refer. The question is
then supposed to be to which of these the uttered demonstrative does refer.
There is no reason to privilege the speaker’s point of view over her audience’s
in such a case. We might try for a synthesis, taking ‘what is said’ to be
determined by some complex calculation based upon a mix of the speaker’s
intentions and the contextual cues. But where these agree, either will do.
28Suppose the uttered sentence was, “That man just stole your wallet”. And now suppose
that, as the intended audience, you can have the answer to just one of these two questions:
To which person did the speaker intend to refer? or: To which person did the demonstrative
she uttered refer?
29Fodor and Lepore (2004, §4) put great emphasis on this point. We shall discuss their
views further below.
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And where they diverge, what we have is a speaker who uttered a certain
sentence intending to express a certain proposition, and an audience that
(reasonably) regards her as having expressed a different proposition. Why
exactly do we need to decide what was ‘really’ said in such cases? I see
no point in the question.30 If so, however, then the question to what some
particular token of “that” refers has no point, either, and I see no reason to
suppose it has an answer. Not because we do not know or cannot tell, but
because it is a bad question.31
There is another reason to reject the speaker’s intention view, too, one
that is less dialectical and more theoretical.32 It is true that the audience
should try to ensure that the referent they assign to an uttered demonstrative
is the object to which the speaker intended to refer. But that is not because
it is a special fact about demonstratives that they always refer to the thing to
which the speaker intended to refer. Rather, it is an entirely general principle
that, if you want to communicate successfully with the speaker, then you
need to ensure that you interpret her words the way she does. This is not
only true for other context-dependent expressions, such as color words and
quantifiers, but also for words like “livid”, about whose meaning speakers
regularly disagree (Heck, 2006).
As Strawson (1950) argued, we must distinguish reference as a relation
between words and things from reference as an act, that is, distinguish
the question to what certain words refer from the question to what a cer-
30Brett Sherman suggested I might put this point this way: On my view, intentions are
not just one more feature that determines semantic reference; rather, they are constitutive
of speaker’s reference, which is the only kind of reference there really is. But then one will
want to know whether my view has problems dealing with the phenomena for which the
distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference was introduced, and we shall
only address those questions below, in §3.6. Still, Sherman’s way of stating the view does
highlight some of its important aspects.
31In “Domain of Discourse”, Gauker raises the question how, when speakers disagree about
what the domain of discourse is, they might resolve their (essentially verbal) disagreement.
Gauker concludes his discussion of what he calls “neutral” solutions—of which mine would
be an example—with these remarks:
My concern is not that we cannot explain in any way the course of events that
results in Tommy and Suzy’s ceasing to argue. No doubt we would be able to
explain it, and would even be able to explain it in terms of each party’s thoughts
and intentions. What we cannot do if we adopt a neutral solution is explain it as
a process in which a sequence of utterances each expresses a unique proposition.
(Gauker, 1997, p. 29, my emphasis)
I agree, but I do not see why this is supposed to be a problem. Gauker had earlier remarked:
It is important to bear in mind that our aim in theorizing about the determinants
of domains of discourse is not merely to explain linguistic behavior. In order to
explain linguistic behavior perhaps we never need to know what the domain
of discourse governing a conversation really is but only what each interlocutor
takes it to be. (Gauker, 1997, p. 27, his emphasis)
Indeed. What is the other aim, though? Gauker does not say, but it would appear that he
is supposing that the aim is determining what “unique proposition” is expressed by each
utterance. On my view, however, utterances do not express unique propositions; they only
express propositions to or for speakers.
32Special thanks to Seth Yalcin here.
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tain person refers.33 And once we do, then my view is akin to Strawson’s:
Words—in this case, uttered demonstratives—never refer; rather, speakers
use demonstratives to refer. But one might well worry that, in rejecting
reference as a relation between words and things, we thereby reject seman-
tics. Strawson’s own skepticism about the applicability of formal methods
to natural language might reinforce that concern. We’ll return to that issue
after discussing some others.
3 Some Objections
There are several reasons one might want to resist the conception of demon-
strative reference that I have elaborated. These fall into several broad
categories. There are worries about the lack of any role for an objective
notion of reference in my account (§3.1). There are concerns about what
the account implies about the relation between language and thought (§3.2).
There are worries about whether I have over-analyzed what is involved in
demonstrative reference (§3.3). There are questions about what this view
implies about the prospects of natural language semantics (§3.4) and, in
particular, about the principle of compositionality (§3.5). And there are
objections that derive from views about the distinction between semantics
and pragmatics (§3.6). But before I address any of these objections, let me
first dispose of two that seem to me simply to register misunderstandings.
An objection some people may have been wanting to lodge for a long time
is that I am confusing the metaphysical question what objectively determines
the reference of a demonstrative with the epistemological question how
people go about determining the reference of a demonstrative. But I am not
confusing these questions. On the contrary, I am consciously running them
together. My view is that there isn’t any such thing as “what objectively
determines the reference of a demonstrative”. There are language-users
who make and interpret demonstrative utterances, and I am sure that there
are interesting things to be said about how they do so, in particular, about
how they converge on a referent and so how they manage to communicate
successfully. These psychological and epistemological questions are, in my
view, the only ones there are here. Once they have been answered, there
just isn’t another, metaphysical question that remains unanswered: the one
about what the referent of the uttered demonstrative really is and what
determines it.34 Such a question is unmotivated, of no obvious interest, and
has no clear content.
Another blunt objection is that, if someone right now just says, out of the
blue, “That is so beautiful”, then no matter how fervently he may intend to
refer to Picasso’s “Child with a Dove”, he can’t. Since all views that privilege
the speaker’s intentions will imply that he can, then there is something
wrong with all such views, including mine. This I flatly deny. Suppose that
33Of course, the distinction would be pointless if referring (as an act) was making it the
case that one’s words referred. The worry that it must be will be discussed below.
34To be clear, I do not mean to deny that the question, say, that makes it the case that the
speaker’s referential intention concerns a certain object is not worth asking or can have no
answer. The question I am rejecting is specific to language.
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Fred has been thinking to himself for some time about “Child with a Dove”,
studying the image he has before his mind’s eye. Lost in contemplation, he
says, “That is so beautiful”. Then I think he plainly does refer to “Child with
a Dove”, and I see no point in our saying otherwise. Other people may have
a hard time knowing what he means, but that is a different matter. And
there is nothing abnormal about this case. People do this kind of thing all
the time; soliloquy is a perfectly acceptable form of speech. And if what the
objector wants to deny is that Fred’s words refer to “Child with a Dove”, then
I am happy to agree. I do not think Fred’s words refer at all.
3.1 Objectivity
I said a moment ago that I regard the question what determines the referent
of a demonstrative as being of no interest. But someone might want to insist
that the question is not just interesting but important. We need the notion
of what an uttered demonstrative really refers to, this objector wants to
say, in order to explain our ability to communicate with one another. The
thought here is structurally similar to one that motivates the view that
public languages, such as English, should be our primary focus when we are
theorizing about language, rather than idiolects. On the idiolectical view,
each speaker has her own language, and successful communication depends
upon there being an appropriate sort of overlap between different speakers’
languages; more precisely, it depends upon speakers’ agreeing about what
various expressions mean. But many philosophers have worried that this
sort of view will make it impossible to explain our ability to communicate
with one another.35
Suppose, for example, that I am walking down the street and ask someone
the time. When I do, I am supposing that she will understand my question.
And when she replies, “It is about noon”, and I come to believe that it is
about noon, I am supposing that her words mean to her what they mean
to me, namely, that it is about noon. What possible reasons could I have
for such suppositions? None, the thought goes, unless I have reason to
suppose that my interlocutor speaks English, just as I do. That is not, of
course, to say that her idiolect must actually be English. Both her idiolect
and mine may diverge from English in various ways, since each of us may
and presumably does misunderstand various words. But what explains our
ability to communicate is the fact that we are both trying to speak English,
which is a public language that acts as a kind objective standard for us. That,
indeed, is what it is to be a speaker of English: to hold one’s own, sometimes
idiosyncratic, use of language accountable to the objective standard that is
established by the English language. And, this line of thought then concludes,
it is only because there is such a standard, only because we are all aiming at
the same target, and so all manage to get somewhere in its vicinity, that we
can communicate the way we do.
35My favorite exposition of this line of thought is due to Wiggins (1997). Such consider-
ations surface frequently in Dummett’s work, too. For references, see my paper “Idiolects”
(Heck, 2006), which defends the idiolectical view against these sorts of criticisms.
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A similar line of thought might seem to be equally compelling in the
present case. People are very often able to communicate using demonstra-
tives, which is to say that they are able to converge on a referent. If that
is not to be a miracle, doesn’t there need to be some objective fact about
what the referent is, a fact that we are all trying to get right? And if we are
actually to explain our ability to get it right, don’t there need to be rules that
determine what the referent is, rules that we all in some sense know and
then apply?
One reason to reject this demand for an objective standard is that it would
prove far too much. We do not just manage to communicate successfully with
one another when we speak literally. We also enjoy widespread communica-
tive success when we use non-literal forms of speech, such as implicature
and even metaphor. So Professor Smith writes, “Mr. Jones is punctual and
has good penmanship”. Does it have to be an objective matter of fact that
his writing what he did implicates that Jones is no good at philosophy if we
are to explain how he can communicate what he does? Do we all have to
know some fixed set of rules by means of which we calculate implicatures? I
do not see why (Heck, 2005, §1). It is enough that we should be able to ask
ourselves such questions as why Smith wrote such a strange letter (that is,
with what intentions he did so), that we should pretty good at figuring that
sort of thing out, and that we should be good enough at doing so that Smith
can rely upon our being able to do so in forming the intentions with which
he speaks. And we are pretty good at discerning the intentions with which
people act. Our existence as social animals depends upon it.
The case of metaphor is even stronger. If Smith writes, “Mr. Jones’s mind
is a collection of souveniers gathered during ventures into the wilderness”,
does it have to be an objective matter of fact that what he wrote means that
Jones is too disorganized to succeed in graduate school if we are to explain
how he can communicate what he does? Do we all have to know some fixed
set of rules by means of which we calculate the significance of metaphors? I
see no reason to suppose we do.
And for much the same reason, I just don’t see any reason to believe
that we all have to know rules that determine what the reference of a
demonstrative is; nor that there have to be any such rules; nor that there has
to be an objective fact about what the reference of a demonstrative is that
we are all trying to get right. In the case of the general issue about idiolects,
I can at least feel the pull of this sort of worry, though, in the end, I think
the pull should be resisted (Heck, 2006). But I do not at all feel the pull of
the corresponding worry here. As I emphasized above, a speaker who utters
a demonstrative knows that he will not be able to communicate successfully
with his intended audience unless he makes it plain to them to which object
he means to refer. It is therefore in his interest to do whatever he needs to
do to make it possible for his audience to discover his intention. Since people
very often do want to communicate with one another, they very often do take
steps to make their intention plain. And since we are generally pretty good
at discerning each other’s intentions, it is no surprise that we are able to do
so in these sorts of cases, too.
Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, our interest, in cases of communication, is
3 Some Objections 22
ultimately in which object the speaker meant to be talking about. This point
is perhaps even clearer if one thinks about questions. If someone asks, “What
is in that glass?” wondering, say, if it is safe to drink, then, if I am going to
answer their question in a way that will lead them to form an appropriate
belief, what I need to know is which glass they mean to be asking about. If,
as my opponent believes, there is a possibility that the words “that glass”
might actually have referred to something other than what the questioner
intended, then it is unclear why I should care about this ‘objective’ referent.
If the speaker failed to secure the right glass as the ‘objective’ referent of
her utterance, but it were clear to me which glass that was, then I would
answer her just as if she had secured it as the ‘objective’ referent.36 The
alleged failure is communicatively irrelevant. But then it is unclear what
work the ‘objective’ referent is doing.37 And the fact that communicative
success only depends upon the speaker’s making it possible for her intended
audience to determine to which object she means to refer seems to me to
make it likely that speakers very often will fail to secure the right object as
the ‘objective’ referent. Of course, it is hard to know, since, as mentioned
some time ago, we know neither what this ‘objective’ referent is supposed
to be nor how it is supposed to be determined. But it is clear enough that
making one’s referential intentions clear to one’s intended audience often
requires one to do much less than would be required to make them clear to
an arbitrary third party, and that suggests to me that one often will not do
what is required to secure an ‘objective’ referent for one’s words, whatever
that might be supposed to mean.
I am insisting, then, that the facts about communication can be explained
in terms of the speaker’s intention to refer to a certain object and her audi-
ence’s attempts to discover that intention. No appeal to an ‘objective’ referent
is required.
3.2 The Autonomy of Language
There is another concern that is in some ways similar to the ones we have
just been discussing but whose source is very different. This concern is
rooted in a commitment to the priority of language over thought. One might
reason as follows. If language is prior to thought, then we must account for
the meanings of utterances without making any use of mentalistic notions
like belief and intention. Hence, the signficance of an utterance of “That is a
frog” simply must be a function of objective facts about the language and non-
mental features of the context. Since my view denies this, it is committed
to the priority of thought over language, so there must be something wrong
somewhere.
Now, frankly, I do not myself regard this as an objection. I am quite com-
fortable with the idea that animals and pre-linguistic infants have thoughts,
and in so far as Augustine suggests that language acquisition involves chil-
36Suppose I ask first, to make sure I know which glass is in question. Is it possible for the
speaker to answer my question wrongly?
37There is a parallel argument that can be made in the case of idiolects (Heck, 2006, pp.
73ff).
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dren’s learning labels for concepts they already possess,38 I suspect he was
to some extent correct. But this view, though I do hold it, seems to me to be
independent of the position for which I have been arguing here. That is: I
think it would be wrong to object to my treatment of demonstrative reference
on the ground that it entails the priority of thought over language, because
it just doesn’t entail it, in any substantial sense.
It should be pretty clear that the position defended here is compatible
with views according to which neither language nor thought is prior to the
other. Such views have been held by Davidson and Dummett, among many
others. On these views, the ability to think about objects is supposed to be
co-eval, somehow, with the ability to refer to objects. I don’t for a moment
claim fully to understand what that means or how it is supposed to work,
but Davidson is quite explicit both (a) that thought without language is
impossible (Davidson, 1984c) and (b) that our account of the significance of
language must simultaneously be an account of the significance of thought
(Davidson, 1984b). Meaning, belief, and intention all have to be treated
together. The idea that the ability to refer demonstratively to objects, or to
interpret others as doing so, is inextricably entangled with the having and
discovering of certain sorts of intentions thus seems to fit quite happily with
Davidson’s views.
That is not to say that the account of demonstrative reference I am
defending is compatible with every possible view about the relation between
language and thought. I am assuming that we can distinguish the ability to
think of an object demonstratively, on a particular occasion, from the ability
to refer to that object demonstratively, on that occasion; more precisely,
the former ability cannot be constituted by the latter, on that particular
occasion.39 That makes my view incompatible with views that hold that
thought is possible only through language. Gauker, for example, denies
that speakers’ intentions can play any role whatsoever in resolving context-
dependence. This denial issues from Gauker’s rejection of the ‘received
view’ that, as he puts it in Words Without Meaning, “the central function of
language is to enable a speaker to reveal his or her thoughts to a hearer”
(Gauker, 2003, p. 3) or, as he put it in an earlier paper, that “linguistic
communication is basically a matter of a speaker’s choosing words that will
convey the propositional content of [one’s] thought to hearers” (Gauker, 1997,
p. 2). But it does not trouble me to be committed to that view.40
38As Wittgenstein famously suggests at the opening of the Philosophical Investigations
(Wittgenstein, 1968).
39The point of this qualification is to allow, as above, that, quite generally, the ability to
think of objects might depend upon the ability to refer to them. It is just that this cannot
hold case by case.
40That said, as Rescorla has pointed out, plenty of people otherwise quite unsympathetic
to Gauker’s position would want to insist “that the primary function of assertion is not to
reveal anything about one’s own mental states, but rather to describe the subject matter
of one’s assertion, which typically will be both extra-linguistic and extra-mental” (Rescorla,
2006, p. 121). I would be one of those people.
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3.3 Children
A related but distinct worry is that my account overly intellectualizes demon-
strative reference in a way that makes communication with children a
mystery. Of course, the focus here has been on communication among lin-
guistically competent, relatively high-functioning adults, but the objection is
nonetheless in order.
Children who are just learning to speak, the thought would be, are not
capable of directing attention, or of estimating intention, in the ways I
have suggested are typical of adult communication involving demonstratives.
Perhaps so.41 In that case, the natural hypothesis would be that children
have some relatively simple method of determining demonstrative reference.
We do not know what that is, so let’s suppose that young children always
interpret an uttered demonstrative (theirs or another’s) to refer to the object
at the center of their attention.42 If so, then that will affect how one com-
municates with a child. The question one must ask oneself, when a young
child speaks, will be not to what he intended to refer, but just what he was
thinking about; when one speaks to the child, one will need to bring one’s
intended referent to the center of the child’s attention, since she will always
interpret it as referring to what is at the center of her attention.
But none of that seems at all implausible. One does have to work harder
to communicate with children who are just learning to speak, since one has
to do most of the work oneself. And the semantics of demonstratives can still
be the same for children as for adults: A demonstrative refers to an object.
3.4 Semantics
We can now return to the anti-semantic argument with which I began this
paper:
(i) Semantics is about truth-conditions.
(ii) Only utterances have truth-conditions.
(iii) So a semantic theory must assign truth-conditions to utterances.
(iv) Only a theory that incorporated a complete theory of human rationality
could assign truth-conditions to utterances.
(v) So there is no such thing as a semantic theory.
If essentially anything that speakers know about each other and the world
can prove relevant to the resolution of context-dependence, then that estab-
lishes (iv). As I suggested earlier, however, I do not think the conclusion
follows, because I think there is a crucial ambiguity in (iii). I can now explain
what that is.
41Then again, perhaps not. There is some evidence that even infants are capable of
recognizing such intentions (Csibra, 2010).
42There is by now excellent evidence that even pre-linguistic children are capable of
thinking about objects as such (Carey, 2009).
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Expanding on an earlier suggestion due to Burge (1974),43 Higginbotham
(1988; 2002) suggests that the targets of semantic theory should be state-
ments of truth-conditions that are conditioned by claims about the values of
contextual parameters. Thus, for example, what a semantic theory should
tell us about the sentence “That is a frog” would be something roughly along
the following lines:44
(1) If u is an utterance of “That is a frog”, and if the contained utterance of
“that” refers to x, then u is true iff x is a frog.
A semantic theory that issues in claims like (1) is certainly ‘about truth-
conditions’, and the things whose truth-conditions it aims to characterize are
utterances. Such a view thus vindicates (i) and is compatible with (ii). Yet
it does not commit us to any form of (iii) that might conflict with (iv): The
theory does not assign a truth-condition to any particular token utterance
(even though it does characterize the truth-conditions of utterances), so
the fact that it is impossible systematically to assign truth-conditions to
individual utterances poses no threat.
It should be clear that this result does not depend upon the details of
Higginbotham’s proposal (if only because I haven’t given any details).45
The underlying idea is simply that a semantic theory should assign truth-
conditions to sentences, but only relative to an assignment of values to
contextual parameters. And the crucial point is that semantics need have
nothing to say about how contextual parameters get their values: It simply
takes for granted that contextual parameters do get values, somehow or
other.
So the ambiguity at the heart of the anti-semantic argument can be
described as follows. On the one hand, (iii) can be understood as saying that
the things whose truth-conditions a semantic theory aims to characterize
can only be utterances, never sentences. On this reading, (iii) follows from (i)
and (ii) and is true, but it does not conflict with (iv). To get a conflict with (iv),
you have to read (iii) as saying that a semantic theory must systematically
assign a truth-condition to each actual utterance. That is, for each utterance
u, it must issue in a categorical statement like:
(2) The utterance u is true iff Kermit is a frog.
So read, however, (iii) does not follow from (i) and (ii), and I see no reason
to think it true. As said, on the conception of semantics I would defend, it
is of no interest to semantics how the values of contextual parameters are
fixed. Semantics only gives us conditionalized T-sentences like (1); semantic
theory itself will never46 put us in a position to discharge the antecedent of
the conditional so as to give us something like (2).
43Similar suggestions were made independently by Weinstein (1974).
44The contrast between “this” and “that” is, of course, not accounted for here, and it is a
nice question (on which Brett Sherman has done interesting work) how we might account for
it within this sort of approach.
45Larson and Segal (1995) develop the proposal in detail.
46The only remotely plausible exception would be “I”. But Sherman has some nice examples
that casts doubt upon whether “I” is an exception.
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Still, one might find such a conception unsatisfying. Semantics, one
might insist, is born from the thought that utterances carry information (or
misinformation) about the world.47 It is because utterances carry informa-
tion, and because speakers are pretty good at extracting it, that it is possible
for us to communicate about the world via language. The goal of semantics
is thus to explain how utterances are able to carry information, and the fact
that an utterance carries certain information is as objective a fact as you like
about it. Any ‘semantics’ that declines to tell us what information is carried
by actual utterances has, therefore, utterly abandoned the very core of what
semantics is about.
Well. If semantics is indeed about the information utterances carry, in
this sense—if there can be no semantic theory without a theory that tells
us what information is carried by which utterances—then, it seems to me,
the facts about demonstrative reference that we have reviewed show that
semantics is impossible absent a complete theory of human rationality. Or,
to put it differently, utterances don’t carry information, in the relevant sense,
so there is nothing for semantics to be a theory of. But that conception of the
goals of semantic theory is optional. A very different conception of semantic
theory understands it as responsive to the questions Chomsky has long urged
should drive linguistic theory quite generally: What speakers know about
their language, how they come to know it, and how that knowledge is put to
use (Chomsky, 1965, Ch. 1; 1986, Ch. 1). Semantic theory can be pursued in
the same spirit Chomsky would have us pursue syntax or phonology: in an
attempt to uncover the cognitive basis of linguistic competence, that is, to
make explicit what competent speakers know about their language, on the
basis of which they are able to speak and understand it.48
This ‘cognitive’ conception of semantics is clearly compatible with what I
am claiming about demonstratives. No doubt it is also consistent with the
cognitive conception that, as part of my understanding of “that”, I grasp
various rules that I use to determine the reference on the basis of contextual
cues. But the cognitive conception in no way demands that there should
be such rules. If what, qua competent speaker, I know about any given
utterance of “That is a frog” is given by (1), then what I must do, if I am to
assign a truth-condition to a particular utterance of it, is to assign a value
to the contained utterance of “that”. It is then an empirical question how I
do that. If what I do is, as I have argued, simply use whatever I happen to
47For example, Soames writes, as if the claim needed no justification: “The central semantic
fact about language is that it carries information about the world” (Soames, 1988, p. 186, his
emphasis). A similar conception is expressed by Salmon (1986). My sense is that it is very
widespread, even if it is not always expressed in these terms.
48This conception of semantics is of course controversial. The exchange between Higgin-
botham (1992) and Soames (1992) is a good place to start. The view has roots in the work
of Davidson and Dummett, though each of them shies away from a full embrace of it (Heck,
2004). It seems to have been “in the air” in Oxford in the late 1970s. For a sympathetic
but ultimately negative assessment, see Martin Davies’s paper “Meaning, Structure, and
Understanding” (Davies, 1981). Its prominence nowadays is largely due to Higginbotham’s
influence, both through his own work and through that of his students (of whom I am one).
For a detailed elaboration, see the first chapter of Knowledge of Meaning (Larson and Segal,
1995).
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know to figure out to whom the speaker meant to be referring, then that is
of no immediate significance for semantics.49
One might worry, however, that this conception of semantics is not avail-
able to me. Even conditionalized T-sentences, such as (1), speak of reference
and truth. To discharge the antecedent of (1), we would have to establish
some such claim as:
(3) The word “that” as it occurs in utterance u refers to Kermit.
thus arriving at (2). But (3) makes a claim about the reference of an ut-
tered demonstrative, and (2) makes a claim about the truth-condition of an
utterance. Yet I have denied that uttered demonstratives refer and that
utterances have truth-conditions. Are all such claims supposed to be false?
Even if they are all false, I am not sure how bad that is. The view would
be that, in using and interpreting language, ordinary speakers ascribe truth-
conditions to utterances and reference to uttered demonstratives, which they
do not really have. I suppose that would be unfortunate, but, if so, it would
be an unfortunate but inevitable fact about the psychology of human speech,
comparable to the way some people think about color: Colors do not exist
as objective properties of objects, although we do and must perceive them
that way, in virtue of how our minds and perceptual systems are designed.
Similarly, then: Utterances do not have truth-conditions in their own right,
though we do and must hear them that way, due to our how minds and
linguistic systems are designed. In short: One could hold a kind of error
theory here, and such views are familiar enough.50
I confess, however, that I am no fan of error theories, so I would rather
avoid any such commitment. The most obvious way to do so is to re-write
conditionalized T-sentences like (1) in an explicitly Strawsonian form:
(4) If u is an utterance of “That is a frog”, and if the speaker of u uses the
contained utterance of “that” to refer to x, then u is true iff x is a frog.
But this would still lead to (2). Perhaps we could try something like:
(5) If u is an utterance of “That is a frog”, and if the speaker of u uses the
contained utterance of “that” to refer to x, then u is uttered truly iff x
is a frog.
But one might independently wonder whether mention of various sorts of
linguistic actions should really be made inside semantic theory.51 We need
another approach.
Reference is generally regarded as a binary relation between a token
expression and an object. But, while I have denied that words refer, I
49I am inclined to go further and suggest that only the cognitive conception of semantics
can accept both (i) and (ii) without commmiting itself to a form of (iii) that is incompatible
with (iv). But I do not really know this to be true. So I shall content myself with the
suggestion that the cognitive conception of semantics receives some support from the fact
that it does allow us to resolve this antinomy.
50Higginbotham (1989) comes close to this view.
51For example, if one thinks that language comprehension is, to some extent, modular,
then it does not seem plausible that the linguistic module should have access to information
about types of linguistic actions.
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certainly have not denied that words refer for speakers (or, more generally,
for conversational participants). So it is open to me to embrace reference as
a ternary relation between an expression, an object, and an agent for whom
the expression refers to that object: t refers to x for S, or something like that.
So, when I deny that uttered demonstratives refer, what I am denying is
that reference is a binary relation. The fundamental relation is ternary or,
as we might also put it, ‘relativized’.
What is it for an expression to refer to an object for a person? I do not
know. Indeed, a large part of the point is that, for the purposes of semantic
theory, we do not need to know. That is not to say that it is not something we
would like to understand, and we shall explore it a bit further shortly. For
now, let me say simply that it is supposed to be closely allied to notions like
interpretation and understanding. Saying that an expression t refers to an
object x for an agent S is thus supposed to be roughly equivalent to saying
that S interprets t as referring to x. Or, if one is worried about the use of the
verb “to refer”: S interprets t as x; or perhaps: S semantically values t as x.
The point is that I am using such language to record facts about how S is
interpreting a bit of speech, and no allusion to norms about how that speech
should be interpreted, or to facts S is trying to get right, is presupposed. We
have S, and we have t, and we have how S interprets t, and that is all.
The ternary notion of reference is also of a piece with Strawson’s notion
of an act of reference, and it allows us, I suggest, better to understand
the nature of such acts and the referential intentions with which they are
performed. What does it mean to say that S refers to x in uttering a certain
demonstrative? It is, I suggest, to say something about how S interprets
her own utterance; it is to say that the demonstrative S utters refers to
x for her. If so, then we can understand why S can perform such acts at
will, since, in planning her utterance, S has already decided how she will
interpret it,52 and, in a case of soliloquy, there will be no more to be said. But
in cases that involve communication, the speaker’s intention will concern
not just how she should interpret her utterance but also how her audience
should interpret it. We can understand this intention as concerning what
its reference should be for the various members of her audience. We might
unify these two ways of regarding the speaker’s intention by saying that
what she intends is that the demonstrative she is about to utter should refer
to x for ‘us’, where the relevant group includes both the speaker and her
intended audience. The speaker’s manipulation of the context—pointing
or whatever—is then a means she adopts towards this end. Her audience,
in turn, must decide how they should interpret the uttered demonstrative,
which is simply to say that they must decide what its referent should be for
52This formulation is not entirely adequate. Both philosophers and linguists tend to focus
on the point of view of the audience, where one is given a sentence and has to interpret it.
Very little ever seems to be said about the problem facing the speaker: about how, given that
one has decided what to say, one is supposed to find the words to express oneself. I have
considered the issue in a few places in my own work (Heck, 2006, 2007), and there are some
helpful remarks in a paper by Rumfitt (1995). Maybe the best philosophical discussion I
know is in a paper by Pagin (2003). But I do not think we know well enough how to talk
about the production of speech, and this lack is surfacing in the text.
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them; this decision will be guided by their desire that its referent should be
the same for them as it is for the speaker, which we might again express by
saying that they need to decide what its referent is for ‘us’.
So, as I said, I think the ternary notion of reference is not just available
but useful: The phenomena discussed in Section 2 are naturally cast in
terms of it.
Back, then, to semantics. I can see no particular reason to suppose that
a binary notion of reference must figure in (1) and (2). The phrase “refers”
might just mean “refers for me”, or “refers for us”, or “refers for the speaker”,
and “true” might be interpreted similarly. Instead of (1) and (2), then, we
would have:
(6) The word “that” as it occurs in utterance u refers, for us, to Kermit.
(7) The utterance u is true for us iff Kermit is a frog.
Better still, we might formulate the theory in terms of “refers for x” and “true
for x”, with the variable filled differently at different times. This would reflect
the fact that the theory of truth I tacitly know not only characterizes the
truth-conditions that utterances have for me but also the truth-conditions I
take those utterances to have for others.53 Clearly, nothing in the deductive
structure of the theory will be affected if we construe it any of these ways.
The significance of the theory’s output will be affected, to be sure, since the
theorems will all involve a relativized notion of truth, but it is not at all clear
that this is any cause for concern. Indeed, the discussion in the preceding few
paragraphs was meant to suggest that the way I put my semantic knowledge
to use in communication precisely involves my figuring out what things
mean for me, for us, or for the speaker.
This commitment to a relativized notion of truth is not, of course, a
commitment to any sort of relativism about truth. Classical relativism is
a doctrine about the truth of propositions or, in the present framework,
interpreted utterances. The relativized truth-predicate in play here is a
predicate of uninterpreted utterances. Saying that a certain utterance is
“true for me” just means that it is true given how I interpret it. This would
be obvious on a view that took semantics to issue in claims like:
(8) The utterance u means that Kermit is a frog.
The relativized version would then be:
(9) The utterance u means for me that Kermit is a frog.
What is being relativized here is the relation of expression, and the same is
true in the case of (6) and (7).
53As I have noted elsewhere (Heck, 2006), it is an important but neglected point that how
I understand my own words is (excepting the obvious cases) also how I understand those of
others.
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3.5 Compositionality
A related group of worries focuses on compositionality.
Fodor and Lepore’s paper “Out of Context”, which has many points of con-
tact with this one, is framed as a discussion of whether context-dependence
is per se incompatible with compositionality. They write:
Here’s the general idea: by stipulation, a sentence of L is compo-
sitional if and only if a (canonical) representation of its linguistic
structure encodes all the information that a speaker/hearer of L
requires in order to understand it. This means that, if L is com-
positional, then having once assigned a linguistic representation
to a sentence token, there is no more work for a hearer to do in
order to understand it. . . . The upshot is that, if compositionality
is assumed, there is a definite point at which the business of un-
derstanding a token of an expression terminates: it terminates at
the assignment of whatever semantic interpretation its linguistic
structure determines.
Well, the present objection is that, by these standards, English
simply isn’t compositional. There would seem to be lots of cases
where you need to know more about a sentence token than its
linguistic structure in order to interpret it: you also need to know
things about the context of the tokening. (Fodor and Lepore, 2004,
pp. 3–4, their emphasis)
Fodor and Lepore do not mean to endorse this objection.54 On the contrary,
the objection is one they imagine being made to their repeated insistence
elsewhere that compositionality is non-negotiable (Fodor and Lepore, 2002).
Still, I have quoted them at such length because my own first reaction to this
objection is stunned silence. I do not understand why one would suppose
that compositionality requires semantic interpretation to be completely
determined by linguistic structure. And “by stipulation”, nonetheless! Should
we really regard compositionality, so understood, as “the key constraint on
theories of linguistic content” (Fodor and Lepore, 2004, p. 3)? Is such a strong
principle really motivated by the usual sorts of arguments from productivity
and systematicity? I think not.55
54For what it’s worth, however, I don’t really understand their response to it. One of
their central conclusions concerns the priority of thought over language. This suggests
that their target might be something like the views discussed in §3.2. But the target they
announce is a familiar stalking horse, namely, conceptual pragmatism, and many of their
other conclusions are directed at it. What puzzles me, though, is that, so far as I can see, they
do not actually defend the strong form of compositionality we are about to discuss. Their own
views entail that, in many cases, “you need to know more about a sentence token than its
linguistic structure in order to interpret it: you also need to know things about” the speaker’s
intentions. Why is this supposed to be less of a threat?
55There are similar worries that focus on the thesis that semantic interpretation must be
modular (Borg, 2004, p. 12), and perhaps this conception of compositionality is motivated
by that thought. If so, then the points about to be made apply as well to this view. But
the more fundamental point is that, while there may be reason to suppose that linguistic
interpretation is modular, there is no reason to suppose that semantic interpretation must be
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The various formal versions of the principle of compositionality are
attempts to develop the intuition that the meaning of a complex expres-
sion depends upon, and is completely determined by, the meanings of its
constituents and they way they are put together. As Szabó (2012) has
emphasized—though surely the point goes back to Davidson (1984d, p. 31)—
this principle says nothing about how the meanings of the constituents are
determined. In particular, it leaves entirely open the question whether the
meaning of a given constituent might vary from occasion to occasion. Simi-
larly, the principle as stated leaves it open whether the expressions we are
discussing are types or tokens. I suppose one might insist that it should be
limited to types. But the arguments that motivate compositionality—the
arguments from productivity and systematicity—concern the actual use of
language, since they concern ordinary speakers’ abilities to understand and
interpret actually uttered expressions.56 If so, then it would be natural to
suppose that (one acceptable version of) the principle must concern token
expressions and so that ‘meaning’ must ipso facto be relativized to occasions
of use. What emerges is then the following sort of principle, which is more or
less what Szabó (2010) calls ‘the compositionality of expression content’:
The content of a complex token expression on the occasion of its
utterance is determined by the meanings of its token constituents
on the occasion of their utterance and the way the former is
constructed from the latter.
Some such principle is very widely endorsed. But the present point is just
that, if one is going to suppose that the meaning of a token can depend upon
more than just the type it is a token of, then that very supposition suggests a
natural version of the principle of compositionality concerning tokens. That
makes it hard to take Fodor and Lepore’s (interlocutor’s) worries seriously.
Still, there is a different worry. In discussing the soldier example, I
suggested that the reference one assigns to an uttered demonstrative may
depend upon the rest of the sentence in which it occurs: If the uttered
sentence is “He must have been up late”, the word “he” is most naturally
taken to refer to the soldier who fainted; if it is “He’s obviously done a lot of
modular, unless one has already decided to limit ‘semantics’ to context-independent elements
of meaning.
56Szabó (2010) suggests the contrary: that the argument from productivity, at least, “does
not even get off the ground when the relevant notion of meaning is expression content”, that is,
utterance content. His reason is that knowledge of language, by itself, is insufficient to allow
one to understand novel token expressions. But surely that was not the idea. The thought
was that one can understand tokens of some types one has never encountered before, whereas
it is not true that one can understand tokens of just any type one has never encountered
before. Why only some types, then? Because a significant, though incomplete, contribution is
made by something one knows about the sentence uttered.
Granted, this does not establish the compositionality of expression content. It is possible
that the meaning one assigns the expression should be derived from the meaning one assigns
to the uttered sentence via a pragmatic process similar to implicature, so that the meaning
assigned to the expression might have little to do with that assigned to the sentence. But
that just means that we need additional arguments, perhaps of the sort Szabó gives, perhaps
of the sort King and Stanley (2004, p. 128) give. Arguments to be given below, about why we
need a notion of ‘what is said’, are also relevant here.
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practicing”, then to the soldier performing the drill; if “He’s obviously done a
lot of practicing to faint on cue”, then to the one who fainted; and so on and
so forth. Isn’t this a straightforward violation of compositionality? It seems
that the reference of the demonstrative depends upon the meanings of other
parts of the sentence to which it is not, in any plausible sense, structurally
related.
This objection really is guilty of conflating the metaphysical and epistemic
senses of “determine”. To see this, note that essentially the same points
could be made about cases of lexical ambiguity. If Bob says, “Joe jumped
off the bank and swam across the river”, then one may not realize that it
is the word that means river bank that has been uttered until one hears
the rest of the sentence.57 This certainly does not show that which word
‘bank’ has been uttered depends upon the meanings of other parts of the
sentence. What is true is that one determines which word has been uttered
using what one knows about other parts of the uttered sentence; this has
no tendency to show that the meaning of this particular token of the word
‘bank’ is determined by anything about other parts of the uttered sentence.58
The same goes for demonstratives. What is true is that, in many cases,
one determines what value to assign an uttered demonstrative on the basis
of one’s understanding of the rest of sentence in which it occurs. This is quite
compatible with its being the case that the meaning of the uttered sentence
is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are combined.
None of this, I should emphasize, is intended as an argument for com-
positionality. I am only arguing that reasonable forms of the principle of
compositionality are no less plausible if the conception of context-dependence
I have been defending is accepted.
3.6 Semantics and Pragmatics
Another batch of objections concerns what the view I am defending implies
about the distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
A first objection is that any view that gives central place to the speaker’s
intentions, as mine to some extent does, will contravene the distinction
between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Recall the following
sort of example, due to Kripke (1977, pp. 263–4). Out across the way we
see a man working in his yard, and one of us asks, “What is Jones doing?”
Answer: “Raking the leaves”. But it isn’t Jones; it’s Smith. Then in some
sense we have referred to Smith; but the name “Jones” never refers to Smith
but only to Jones. So the semantic referent of the expression “Jones” was
Jones, but the speaker’s referent was Smith.
57Nowadays, it is commonly held that there are really two words ‘bank’ that are pronounced
alike. But the remarks in the text do not depend upon this claim and can easily be modified
if it is not accepted.
58Much the same can be said about structural ambiguity and even about merely sonic
similarities. Suppose one cannot quite tell whether it was a ‘g’ or a ‘c’ that filled the blank
when Martha said, “I had my -oat cleaned, and they shrunk it”. Then one’s understanding
of the second conjunct and general knowledge of the world will help one decide what word
Martha uttered and so what she said.
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The other day, a friend of mine was over, and I saw one of our cats lying
on the sofa. I said to him, “That cat loves to have his belly rubbed”. I said
this because I thought it was my cat Snarfy, who really does love to have
his belly rubbed. In fact, however, it was his sister Lily, who enjoys a belly
rub from time to time but isn’t nearly as enthusiastic about them as Snarfy
is. So I intended to refer to Snarfy, and yet it seems clear that I did not.
Shouldn’t we say, then, that the semantic referent was Lily, but the speaker’s
referent was Snarfy? If so, isn’t the semantic referent determined, not by the
speaker’s intentions, but rather by something like contextual cues?
No. To see this, we need to be more specific about the intentions with
which I spoke in the example just given. The first point to note is that I
clearly did intend to refer to the cat on the sofa. Contrary to what I believed,
that cat was Lily, but it does not follow that I did not intend to refer to her:
Intention is intensional. Nor does the fact that I intended to refer to the cat
on the sofa imply that I did not also intend to refer to Snarfy. I did. If I did
not think that the cat on the sofa was Snarfy, then I would not have said
what I did. So I had two intentions, to refer to the cat on the sofa and to refer
to Snarfy, and these intentions were linked: I intended to refer to Snarfy by
referring to the cat on the sofa; I thought I could do this because I thought
that the cat on the sofa was Snarfy. This fact about the structure of my
intentions surfaced in my expectations about how I would be interpreted. My
friend did not yet know Snarfy’s name, so I did not expect him to interpret
my utterance of “that cat” as referring to Snarfy but rather to the cat on
the sofa. (Interpretation is intensional, too.) Or, better: I expected him
to interpret my utterance as referring to that cat, that is, to interpret the
utterance in terms of a demonstrative thought. So what I expected him to
conclude, if he took me at my word, was that that cat likes to have his belly
rubbed.59
We should distinguish, then, between what we might call proximal and
distal referential intentions.60 Exactly how this distinction should be drawn
is not a question we can discuss in detail here, so I shall have to leave it at
this intuitive level.61 The point is that, once we make such a distinction, we
shall want to say that what my utterance of a demonstrative refers to, even
for me, is determined by my proximal intentions. So, in this case, even for
me, the uttered demonstrative referred to Lily, not to Snarfy, because my
proximal intention was to refer to that cat, and that cat is Lily. (Reference is
extensional.)62
59As Kaplan notes in “Afterthoughts” (Kaplan, 1989a, §II), essentially the same point
applies to his Carnap–Agnew case: Kaplan does not just intend to refer to the picture of
Carnap but also to the picture behind him, and he intends to refer to the former by referring
to the latter.
60This distinction is similar in spirit to one drawn by Bach (1992).
61I have discussed related matters elsewhere (Heck, 2006, pp. 82ff), as has Rumfitt (1995,
pp. 850ff).
62With what right do I so casually speak of our thoughts about “that cat”? How do we know
what “that cat” refers to? Isn’t our topic demonstratives? Yes, but our topic here is language,
that is, the use of demonstrative expressions; our topic is not demonstrative thought. The
two are undoubtedly related. In many uses of demonstratives, the speaker will think of the
object to which she intends to refer demonstratively: That is, she will intend to refer to that
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Still, one might think I face an even worse problem. The worry is that,
once speaker’s intentions are granted central importance, they cannot but
assume overriding importance. Fodor and Lepore, whose views are in many
ways similar to mine, deny that “. . . the right interpretation of an utterance
depends on the linguistic conventions that determine what the speaker
‘strictly and literally says’ ” (Fodor and Lepore, 2004, p. 12).63 What they
mean is apparent from a footnote.
Suppose someone says “It’s raining here” believing, wrongly, that
he is in Pittsburgh. Then the right interpretation for the hearer
to impose on the utterance is it’s raining in Pittsburgh, not it’s
raining here. To insist on the ‘literal’ meaning would be pointless
and pedantic, not to say uncharitable. (Fodor and Lepore, 2004,
fn. 25)
The thought is obviously that the speaker intends to say that it is raining
in Pittsburgh, and Fodor and Lepore want to insist that, since the speaker’s
intention dominates, then that is what he said.64 But that just seems wrong.
And it is wrong. Suppose this person has just been asked if he’d like to go
for a picnic. Then whether he looked out the window or checked the weather
online, the fact that he believes he is in Pittsburgh is of no significance. What
he has said is that it is raining where he is; that is the only thing relevant to
the question at issue. But perhaps Fodor and Lepore have a different sort
of case in mind. Suppose that what has been asked is whether the Pirates
game will be cancelled.65 Our confused speaker looks out the window and
says, “It’s raining here”. Then there is a sense, no doubt, that what the
speaker means is that it is raining in Pittsburgh. But we can explain that
intuition in familiar terms: The speaker’s remark would be irrelevant unless
he thought that he was in Pittsburgh, in which case the fact that it was
raining where he was would imply that it was raining in Pittsburgh. But
nonetheless, what he has said is that it is raining where he is.
What allows us to distinguish what the speaker said from what the
speaker meant is the fact that the speaker used the word “here”, which, as a
matter of its meaning—of what it means in his language, of what it means
to him—cannot be used to refer to Pittsburgh simply because that is where
thing, and she will expect her audience to interpret her by forming demonstrative thoughts
of their own. But I see no reason to suppose that non-anaphoric uses of demonstratives must
always involve demonstrative thoughts in this way, as Evans (1982, §9.1) sometimes seems to
suggest. Cases of ‘deferred ostension’ are clear counter-examples unless they can be set aside.
But it is hard to see why one would want to set them aside unless one was antecedently
committed to the view that demonstrative reference requires demonstrative thought.
63What Fodor and Lepore strictly and literally say is that certain considerations due to
Evans do not establish this claim. But they give every impression that they want to deny it.
64One might suggest that Fodor and Lepore simply mean to deny that how one ought to
interpret the speaker is determined by what he strictly and literally said. But that has been
obvious since Grice, if not before. That is: If they are not just pointing out that what the
speaker means may differ from what the speaker said, then the scare quotes around “strictly
and literally says” must be there because they are skeptical about the very notion. As, in
some ways, am I, though there are different ways to be skeptical about it.
65The Pirates are Pittsburgh’s professional baseball team. Baseball games can be post-
poned due to rain.
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one thinks one is. It would be too strong to say that it must be used to refer
to the place where one is. One can say, pointing at a location on a map,
“Here is where the treasure is”. Precisely what restrictions the use of “here”
does impose is therefore unclear. But the essential point is that the use of
“here” must impose some restrictions on what one can say by uttering it. Its
imposing those restrictions is what makes it a word with meaning rather
than so much nonsense.
As obvious as this point is, it often seems to be overlooked. Example after
example has been given over the last several years to show that one can say
many different things by uttering even very simple sentences, such as “That
ink is blue”:66 One might mean that the ink appears blue in the bottle, or
that it will appear blue upon drying, or yet other things. But little notice ever
seems to be taken of how few things might be said by uttering this sentence,
that is, of how many things there are that cannot be said by uttering it.
For example, under no circumstances can one say, by uttering the sentence
“That ink is blue”, that the existence of a measurable cardinal implies that
there are non-constructible sets. And that is a very good thing. If one could
say absolutely anything by uttering absolutely any sentence, then the job
of interpretation would be infinitely harder than it is.67 The point is just a
variant of one Chomsky made famous: If too many possible languages were
an option for the child, then it would be all but impossible for children to
acquire languages under the conditions they actually do. Similarly: If there
were too many possible interpretations of an uttered sentence, then it would
be all but impossible for us to interpret it under the actual conditions we do.
So far as I can see, therefore, absolutely everyone has to acknowledge
that the words one uses, even if they do not determine what one says in
uttering them, nonetheless sharply constrain what one can say by uttering
them. That, as I said, is what makes them words rather than the verbal
equivalent of a gesture. The only question worth discussing is therefore how
the words one uses constrain what can be said by uttering them.
Note carefully how that was phrased: The words one uses restrict what
one can say by uttering them. It should be clear that only “say” is appropriate
here. The words one uses do not constrain what one can, in Grice’s sense,
mean by uttering them, since what one means includes what one implicates,
and it is easy to see that, given any proposition and any sentence, there are
circumstances in which one can implicate that proposition by uttering that
sentence.68 Of course, the words one uses will make it easier or harder to
mean this or that, but the notion of constraint to which I’m appealing is
different: It is the one at work when one says, for example, that the sentence
“He saw John in the mirror” does not have as a reading that John saw himself
66This particular example is due to Travis (2000). Similar examples have been given by
Sperber and Wilson (1995), Recanati (2004), and many others.
67Maitra (2007, §5) makes some similar remarks, though her topic is the problem of shared
content, to be discussed in Section 4.
68A boring way to get this result is to assume that some conditional p→ q is sufficiently
salient to the conversational participants, where q is what one wants to implicate and p is
what the utterance of the sentence will semantically express. But it’s not hard to come up
with more interesting examples.
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in the mirror. We have to understand this as: The sentence cannot be used
to say that John saw himself in the mirror. We have to understand it that
way because the sentence can, of course, be used to mean anything you like,
given appropriate circumstances.
This observation allows me to answer a question some readers will have
been wanting to ask for some time, namely, why we need a notion of ‘what is
said’ here at all or, better, why we need a ‘fully propositional’ notion of what
is said. The alternative would be to try to make do with (i) a notion of what is
said that is essentially context-independent and is characterized in terms of
the meaning of a sentence and (ii) a context-bound notion of what a speaker
means. The former notion is not ‘fully propositional’, because sentences as
such do not express propositions but only what are sometimes called ‘gappy’
propositions or ‘proposition radicals’. For example, the sentence “That is a
frog” would express a gappy proposition we might indicate as: x is a frog.
Communication would then be understood as consisting, in the general case,
in the expression of gappy propositions, through which process complete
propositions are meant.69
One objection to this sort of view is that it seems to conflate very different
sorts of pragmatic processes. It just feels wrong to lump the determination of
the reference of a demonstrative in with the calculation of implicatures. And,
clearly, the calculation of implicatures will in many cases depend upon the
resolution of context-dependence: What is implicated will depend, e.g., upon
which thing has been said to be a frog. But the issue is complicated, since
there are also cases in which one can implicate without expressing a complete
proposition at all. Indeed, it is easy to construct cases—one can start with
Strawon’s famous example, “That’s a fine red one”—in which the implicature
turns precisely on the fact that no proposition is expressed. So it is not true
that implicature always requires the resolution of context-dependence and
so must turn on what is (propositionally) said.
But there is a better answer, namely, that the most natural explication
of the notion of what a sentence means is in terms of how it constrains the
linguistic acts that can be performed by uttering it, and that these acts must
be characterized not in terms of what is meant but in terms of what is said.
As I understand the sentence “That is a frog”, for example, its meaning
makes a certain range of linguistic acts available to me: By uttering this
sentence, I can say of any object I choose that it is a frog; I cannot say
anything else. But, as noted, it is only what I can say that is so constrained,
so the notion of what is said underlies the notion of sentence-meaning.70
It is worth illustrating these themes with a more complex sort of example.
Consider the much discussed phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction.
As mentioned earlier, a sentence like “Everyone is on the bus” can appar-
ently be used to say different things on different occasions. There are several
accounts of why. One such account supposes that relevant material is elided;
another supposes that the speaker can freely ‘enrich’ the proposition ex-
69Bach (2004b) is the best-known proponent of this sort of view.
70The point can be put more colorfully this way: If one wants to speak of the meaning of a
sentence as a ‘gappy’ proposition, then that will make good sense only if some special role is
assigned to the result of filling the gaps.
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pressed by the words themselves; yet a third supposes that there is no
context-dependence here at all and that the phenomenon is pragmatic. But
there has been little effort by the proponents of these accounts to address
the critical question why sentences containing quantifiers have the very
restricted range of meanings they do. Consider, for example, these three
sentences:
(10) Everyone who read a book skipped some pages.
(11) Everyone who read skipped some pages.
(12) Everyone skipped some pages.
It seems to me that (10) has the reading: Everyone who read a book skipped
some pages in each of the books she read. Neither (11) nor (12) can have that
reading, however, even if it is clear, in the case of (11), that only books were
being read and, in the case of (12), that the only people under discussion are
those who read a book.
How should this be explained? It is not easy to see what any of the
accounts mentioned so far might have to offer. If the restriction in place in
(12) is to be explained by elision, enrichment, or pragmatics, then it is far
from clear why (12) could not be an elided form of (10), why (12) could not be
enriched to (10), or why the pragmatic processes could not extract (10) from
(12). I do not say that no such explanation could be given. I simply point
out that no such explanation has been given or even, so far as I am aware,
seriously attempted.71 It is a significant advantage of the view defended by
Stanley and Szabó (2007),72 according to which quantifiers are associated
with covert arguments, that it offers, and indeed is to some extent motivated
by, precisely such examples.73
But whatever the right explanation, every reasonable view must signif-
icantly constrain what one can say by uttering “Everyone is on the bus”.
One way or another, such a view must ensure that the speaker’s freedom is
limited, so far as “everyone” is concerned, to fixing the domain over which
that quantifier will range. (There are similar things to be said about “the
bus”.) No matter how fervent, the speaker’s intentions cannot make “ev-
eryone” mean anything other than everyone in group G, but can only affect
which group G is at issue. Maybe that isn’t quite right. Maybe the speaker’s
freedom is more or less extensive than I have just suggested. But it doesn’t
matter. The point is that there simply have to be some such constraints on
the speaker’s freedom, whether they lie in the syntax, in the lexicon, in the
71Hall (2008, §4) does discuss this sort of issue, in an attempt to defend free enrichment.
By her own account, however, her discussion is just a beginning, and the locality constraint
she mentions does not seem to address the example just presented.
72Fodor and Lepore (2004, p. 5) discuss this sort of view briefly, saying only that they “don’t
know of anything principled” to be said in favor of it. Perhaps what I am saying here counts.
73Stanley and Szabó do not discuss this sort of example, but a suitable story falls directly
out of their account. Very roughly, when (10) has the reading we are discussing, it has roughly
the structure of “Everyone who read a book skipped some pages in it”. Thus, (10) has this
reading because one of its structures is that of a donkey sentence, and donkey sentences
typically have universal readings. But (11) cannot have this reading for much the same
reason that “Everyone who read skipped some pages in it” is ungrammatical.
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rules governing enrichment, or in some as yet unimagined place. We would
not be talking about language otherwise.
Giving the speaker’s intentions a central role does not, therefore, imply
giving the speaker’s intentions the sort of over-riding importance that would
obliterate the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, between what
is said and what is meant.74 As I have emphasized, everyone must agree
that the meaning of the word “everyone” constrains what can be said by
uttering it. As before, it is what one can say that is so constrained, not what
one can, in Grice’s sense, mean; so that distinction survives intact.75 But if
we draw the distinction between what is said and what is meant in these
terms, then we need not try to connect it to what is more or less objective,
nor to what is more or less rule-governed. In particular, we do not need to
suppose that context itself somehow determines what is said in such cases.
If, for example, the right thing to say about “everyone” is that it must always
mean: everyone in group G, so that the locus of context-dependence is the
domain for the quantifier, then what I have been arguing is that the domain
is not (and does not need to be) fixed ‘by context’, in the sense that objective
facts about the circumstances in which an utterance is made will fix this
parameter.76 Rather, in uttering the sentence “Everyone is on the bus”, the
speaker will (proximally) intend to speak of the members of some group G,
and her utterance will, for her, express the proposition that everyone in that
group is on the bus. Her audience will then have the task of determining
which group this is, and successful communication will depend upon their
performing this task correctly. There is no need for an ‘objective standard’ at
which we are all aiming—though we might now see the desire for one as an
understandable over-reaction to the need for language to constrain what can
be said.
Other cases can be handled similarly. Consider gradable adjectives, like
“tall”, whose contribution to the significance of a given utterance seems to
vary with the occasion. One popular story, developed in work by Kennedy
(1999) and others, has it (again very roughly) that such adjectives are associ-
ated with an appropriate scale—a scale of height, in the case of “tall”—and
that such an adjective always means something like: is higher (or lower)
than some cut-off point δ. Again, the details of this story may be wrong, but
the spirit of the story must be right: The speaker’s freedom must be limited
and, if we side with Kennedy for the moment, then it is limited to selecting
the cut-off point. No matter how fervently one might intend otherwise, then,
one cannot utter “John is tall” and thereby say that John is a fish (though, of
course, one could mean that John is a fish). What I have been arguing then
concerns how δ is fixed. I claim that it is not fixed ‘by context’ but by the
speaker and her audience, each for herself, and that communication depends
74It may be that part of the reason it can seem as if I would be committed to such a
conclusion is the fact that the linguistic meanings of demonstratives place so few constraints
on what they can be used to say.
75And so, in that sense, Grice is absolutely right that “what someone has said [is] closely
related to the conventional meaning of the words. . . he has uttered” (Grice, 1989, p. 25).
76Independent arguments could of course be given concerning this case. Gauker (1997)
discusses some relevant examples. See note 31 for discussion of his treatment of them.
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upon convergence.
The case of color is much harder, but we don’t understand color, anyway.
Still, some significant work has been done on the semantics of color words
(Szabó, 2001; Reimer, 2002; Rothschild and Segal, 2009; Kennedy and Mc-
Nally, 2010), and I see no reason to despair. As I have said, there have to be
constraints on the range of things one can mean by “blue”. Whatever those
constraints are, the view view for which I’ve been arguing concerns how the
meaning the word has on a particular occasion is, and is not, determined.
So the worry was that the emphasis on speakers’ intentions—my ‘admis-
sion’ that pragmatic processes affect what is said—somehow undermines the
very notion of ‘what is said’ and leads us down the road to relevance theory,
truth-conditional pragmatics, or what have you. But it should be clear by
now, I hope, that there is nothing in the position for which I have argued that
should incline one toward such views. Quite the contrary, in fact. Such views,
it seems to me, can only seem less attractive once the ‘semantic’ perspective
to which they are opposed has been freed from any association with the view
that ‘what is said’ must somehow be determined by rule.
4 Closing
Whether or not uttered demonstratives ‘objectively’ refer, speakers who
utter demonstratives will intend to speak about particular objects, and their
audiences will interpret their utterances as being about various objects, with
successful communication requiring (at least) agreement. The question I
have been asking is: Once this broadly psychological story has been told,
what role is left for the ‘objective’ referent of the uttered demonstrative? I
see none. We do not need it to explain successful communication (§3.1); we
do not need it to make sense of natural language semantics generally (§3.4)
or, in particular, of compositionality (§3.5); and we do not need it to respect
the distinction between semantics and pragmatics (§3.6).
Now, as I mentioned at the outset, and as will have become clear in the
last section, the discussion of demonstratives has been intended as a window
onto context-dependence quite generally. The overall picture is that, where
E is an expression whose meaning may vary from occasion to occasion, then
E’s context-independent meaning will fix a range of meanings it can have on
a given occasion of utterance, and the selection of a particular meaning is
accomplished not ‘by context’ but, rather, by the speaker and her audience,
each for herself, with successful communcation requiring convergence.
This picture is almost present in a paper by Glanzberg. He argues that
the contextual parameters associated with gradable adjectives, in particular,
require what he calls an “indirect metasemantics”, which he describes in
these terms:
A contextual parameter with an indirect metasemantics must
be set by the various pieces of information context provides, but
context does not simply hand us a value for such a parameter,
nor does it hand us a uniform rule for computing the value from
a specific piece of contextual information. Rather, a range of
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contextual information and computational rules must be taken
into account and weighed in working out the value from context.
(Glanzberg, 2007, p. 19)
What fixes [such] values will be complicated combinations of such
factors as what is salient in the environment, speakers’ intentions,
hearers’ intentions, coordinating intentions, linguistic meaning,
general principles governing context, discourse structure, etc.
From these resources, values will have to be computed. . . . [S]uch
computations will often allow for accommodation and negotiation.
(Glanzberg, 2007, p. 25)
I could not agree more—except that Glanzberg never quite recognizes the
full implications of this way of thinking.77 Who is performing these com-
putations? Well, who is accommodating and negotiating? The speaker and
her audience, obviously. So these computations are not ones the theorist
performs to determine ‘what is said’, but ones the speaker and her audi-
ence perform in an effort to understand one another. The better way to
put Glanzberg’s point would therefore be: Such contextual parameters do
not have a ‘metasemantics’ in the usual sense; there is no story to be told
about how context fixes their values, because it doesn’t. Rather, values are
assigned to the contextual parameters by the speaker and her audience,
and the process through which they determine what values to assign is not
governed by “a uniform rule” but is shaped by a common goal: successful
communication, which requires them to agree. It is unsurprising that ac-
comodation and negotation should be central to this enterprise, and it is
equally unsurprising that so many “factors” should be involved. As we have
seen, there is, in fact, no limit to the information on which the speaker and
her audience may draw as they attempt to converge.
But now one might wonder just how successful this attempt typically is.
Consider again the case of “tall”. How likely is it that, in ordinary sorts of
cases, such as when Peggy says to Sue, “Bill is tall”, the speaker and her
audience really do manage to converge on a value for the parameter, on a
cut-off point? It does not seem particularly likely. If not, then won’t we have
to say that, in a wide range of quite ordinary cases, in which we might have
thought we were communicating successfully, we actually aren’t?
Before I address that question, let me raise another. Forget about com-
munication. Is it really plausible that we always have a precise cut-off point
in mind when we utter the word “tall”? Mabye not. If so, however, then,
according to me, the speaker in such cases does not express any specific
proposition, since, according to me, the only thing there is to determine that
proposition is the speaker’s intention,78 and I have just conceded that the
77Glanzberg (2007, p. 25) also contrasts this sort of case with the case of demonstratives,
about which he remarks that “[t]here are roughly two options”. Obviously, I disagree, but his
case against relativism is only strengthened if it turns out that even demonstratives do not
fit the model of context-dependence that the relativist assumes. I am happy to acknowledge,
too, that the process of fixing (or, perhaps better, agreeing on) a value for a parameter might
be very different depending upon the parameter.
78Careful! I am not claiming here that the speaker’s intention determines what proposition
is expressed, in some objective sense, but only what proposition the speaker expresses.
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speaker’s intention is insufficiently precise to determine such a proposition.
And the same presumably goes for the speaker’s audience. Since they prob-
ably do not have any specific cut-off in mind, they do not understand the
speaker to be expressing any specific proposition.
These issues are undoubtedly worth extended discussion, and they are
not going to get it here. But let me mention four points.
First, we can see in such considerations another reason one might want
to appeal to a mechanism that fixes values for contextual parameters on
the basis of objective features of context: By fixing a cut-off point for us,
perhaps context can determine both what proposition the speaker expresses
and what proposition she is understood by the audience to have expressed,
and do so in such a way as nearly to guarantee agreement.79
Second, it has not been widely appreciated80 that this problem, which we
may call the ‘problem of shared content’, threatens every view except the
one just mentioned: that context objectively resolves context-dependence. In
particular, so-called ‘minimalist’ views (Borg, 2004; Cappelen and Lepore,
2005), according to which a sentence like “The ink is blue” actually does
express some fixed proposition (modulo tense), are just as threatened by it
as my view is. This is because, on the minimalist view, this fixed proposition,
although ‘semantically expressed’ by the speaker’s words, is almost never
what she communicates (and has, indeed, no very clear role to play, though
that is a different issue). The fact that the speaker’s words express some fixed
proposition thus does not help us understand how successful communication
occurs; pragmatic processes play at least as big a role for the minimalist
as they do for me, and as they do for people who like gappy propositions.
So, while the problem is real, it is solvable in principle, since (or so I have
argued here) the view that context objectively resolves context-dependence
is untenable.
Third, unless you are an epistemicist about vagueness (Williamson, 1994),
it should on reflection not seem very plausible that context does fix a definite
cut-off point for a given utterance of “tall”. Indeed, cases like “tall” seem
to me to pose a serious problem for epistemicism, for just this reason. But,
however that may be, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the
propositions speakers ordinarily express using “tall” are, in some sense we
would like better to understand, imprecise. And while it would be a mistake
to confuse this sort of imprecision with vagueness, my own suspicion is that
the two are not unrelated (Heck, 2003).81
Finally, it is generally assumed that successful communication requires,
79The view to which such considerations lead is thus very much Gauker’s: His point is
largely that the right conception here is a sort of externalism according to which it is not
just the contents of our utterances but also the contents of our thoughts that are fixed by
contextual factors (Gauker, 2003). For what it’s worth, my own view is that such a conception
of thought, which is explored in some detail by Gross (2005), is incoherent.
80A clear exception is Maitra (2007).
81Nor am I alone. The sort of ‘dynamic’ picture of vagueness one finds in Tappenden (1993;
1995), according to which ‘precisification’ is a very real part of our use of vague terms, is very
much of a piece with the view I have just expressed. Some of the ideas expressed by Shapiro
(2006) are in a similar vein, too, despite the fact that his view has ‘contextualist’ aspects that
I would reject.
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in the relevant sorts of cases, that the audience should come to entertain
the very proposition that the speaker has expressed. In fact, however, this is
not at all clear. I have argued elsewhere that the case of demonstratives is
itself a counterexample (Heck, 2002). In a way, that case is very different,
because my view is not that communication might succeed despite disagree-
ment about reference. Rather, I regard the ‘propositions’ speakers believe
and express as fine-grained, individuated not just by reference but also by
(something like) sense, and I think speakers and their audiences do not have
to agree about sense to communicate successfully. Still, the case is suggestive.
Perhaps successful communication does not require the speaker and her
audience to interpret her utterance as expressing the very same proposition,
but only as expressing ‘similar’ propositions. The problem, of course, is to
say what “similar” means. But it has long been noted in the literature on
vagueness that lack of a sharp cut-off will have no practical effect so long as
its precise location does not affect the categorization of the objects presently
under discussion.82
I suspect that this idea can be developed in such a way as to allow us
to articulate an appropriate notion of similarity. But that is different from
saying I have so developed it, so further discussion of this issue will have to
be deferred to another occasion.83
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